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ABSTRACT 
It has been nearly two decades since the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars of secession and 
subsequent deployment of peace operations into the region, and over that time numerous 
attempts have been made to assess the success of these missions.  This thesis evaluates 
elements of these peace operations, which, although generally considered critical to their 
success, have been largely overlooked in these assessments.  These include efforts to 
promote social well-being and combat organized crime in Bosnia, and the United 
Nations’ preventive deployment to Macedonia.  This study concludes that the peace 
mission in Bosnia promoted some aspects of social well-being, reduced the level of 
violent organized crime, and prevented a recurrence of violent conflict.  However, its 
long-term success has been undermined by its inability to establish a truly unified, 
sovereign nation with an effective central government.  In comparison, the preventive 
deployment to Macedonia has had a more positive long-term effect, promoting security 
and stable governance without undermining the state’s independence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
 It has been nearly two decades since the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars of 
secession and subsequent deployment of peace operations into the region, and over that 
time numerous attempts have been made to evaluate the success of these missions and of 
post-Cold War peace operations in general.  The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate this 
literature to determine if there are elements of the peace operations that have not received 
adequate attention, and then analyze these elements to gain a better understanding of the 
effectiveness of these missions individually and as a whole.  The findings from this study 
will then be reviewed and compared to better understand the long-term impact of these 
missions, identify any recurring themes and lessons, and determine if any of them have 
been applied in doctrine or practice. 
 This is an important subject for study because determining the long-term 
effectiveness of the Balkan peace operations can help clarify the current state of stability 
and security in a strategically located region with a proven ability to spark broader 
conflict.  It may offer new perspectives on whether the states in the region are moving in 
the right direction and are on their way to becoming fully functioning, sovereign 
members of the international community, or if they are not making progress and, instead, 
sliding in the wrong direction and reverting back to weak, failing states.  This is 
significant because weak and failing states pose a growing threat to the ever-more 
interconnected international community, undermining stability, security, the rule law, and 
economic development.  Conclusions reached in analyzing these missions can also 
provide lessons for peace operations in other regions of the globe, especially those 
committed to the development of long-term, sustainable stability and security. 
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This literature review analyzes a cross-section of interpretations and approaches 
to evaluating post-Cold War peace operations, with an emphasis on the missions in the 
Balkans, lessons learned, and U.S. involvement and national interests.  It evaluates 
literature representing a comparative analysis, an institutionalist view, a realist 
perspective, and a functional critique.  The selected works were chosen because they are 
considered some of the strongest representations of the different viewpoints in this field.  
The goal is to identify enduring themes, agreements, and differences, and any potential 
gaps in the literature that could benefit from further research and analysis. 
1. Comparative Analysis 
 One of the more common methods of analyzing peace operations is the 
comparative approach, which provides a general overview and broad recommendations 
based on an evaluation of several case studies representing different regions and types of 
conflicts.  Two of the seminal works representing this approach are UN Peacekeeping, 
American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s1 and Twenty-First-Century Peace 
Operations,2 both edited by Durch.3  The first work, a compilation of case studies of 
United Nations (UN) peace operations up through 1995, offers a number of observations 
by Durch, such as that the UN has overextended itself in a number of missions, including 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia), as a result of Security Council members turning to 
the UN to promote their political agendas and avoid unilateral action.  He also takes the 
position that military forces are increasingly functioning as support and security for 
civilian agencies and objectives, yet coordination between military and civilian agencies 
and organizations (UN and non-UN) is lacking and structural deficiencies need to be 
                                                 
1 William J. Durch, editor, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
2 William J. Durch, editor, Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2006). 
3 William J. Durch, senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center and former project director for the 
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. 
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addressed.4  From an American standpoint, Daalder5 points out that the U.S. has been 
more willing to be involved in peace operations in the post-Cold War environment, but 
has struggled with defining its role and commitment, especially from a military 
viewpoint.6 
 Several methods for evaluating peace operations are analyzed, including simply 
meeting the peace mission’s objectives.  Although this is a straightforward and useful 
criterion, it is difficult to apply in practice because the objectives of the host nation, 
contributing states, and members of the Security Council are often at odds and can shift 
as the situation on the ground changes.  Durch tends to agree with Diehl’s7 two basic 
criteria for evaluating peace operations,8 which include how well an operation deterred or 
prevented violent conflict and how effective it was at facilitating “resolution of the 
disagreements underlying the conflict.”9  Based on Diehl’s criteria most of the examples 
in the book would be considered overall failures, including Bosnia, which, although it 
eventually stopped the violence, did not resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. 
 Durch updated his work a decade later with Twenty-First-Century Peace 
Operations, which evaluates the types of peace operations most prevalent since the Cold 
War: those dealing with the aftermath of stalemated internal wars halted by external 
military force, with outcomes that do not satisfy any of the belligerents.  These peace 
operations are carried out in high-risk environments with destroyed economies, 
ineffective governments, and deficient peace treaties.  They are undertaken with 
insufficient knowledge of the conflict, limited resources, and unknown probabilities of 
                                                 
4 William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons in the 1990s,” in UN Peacekeeping, 
American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 22. 
5 Ivo H. Daalder, associate professor at the University of Maryland and director of research at the 
Center for International and Security Studies. 
6 Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping,” in 
UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 35–36, 60–61. 
7 Pual F. Diehl, Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. 
8 Durch, UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, 17. 
9 Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993), 34, 37. 
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success.10  Peace operations in the mid-1990s, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, 
proved especially difficult because they were carried out during active civil wars, the 
parties to the conflicts were not fully committed to making peace, and attempted peace 
negotiations had not been able to resolve the underlying causes of conflict.11 
 Cousens and Harland’s evaluation of post-Dayton Bosnia in Durch’s Twenty-
First-Century Peace Operations illustrates these points.12  They believe the Dayton 
Accords were not implementable from the start because they were based more on 
compromise than the needs on the ground, stabilized lines of confrontation while 
simultaneously attempting to override ethnic divisions, and established a central 
government too weak to carry out necessary reforms.  Furthermore, the belligerents were 
not truly ready to make peace.  The subsequent peace operations were undermined by 
disagreements over relevant roles and responsibilities, especially between military and 
civilian components.  The focus on early elections distracted international actors from 
addressing critical issues such as organized crime and a weak rule of law.  The OHR was 
not initially strong enough to carry out its mandate, but its powers were then augmented 
to such a degree that Bosnian authorities were dissuaded from taking responsibility for 
developing and running their nation.  Due to these deficiencies the vast resources 
expended on Bosnia have had disappointing results, illustrating how difficult it is to keep 
and build peace after the outbreak of civil war.13 
 In 2010 Diehl and Druckman14 reevaluated the effectiveness of the peace mission 
in Bosnia.  They concluded that Dayton was successful at abating violence in Bosnia, 
which they consider to be the primary goal of peace missions.  They support this claim by 
noting that Bosnia has not had an inter- or intra-state war, combat-related deaths, or 
                                                 
10 William J. Durch, with Tobias C. Berkman, “Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So 
Far,” in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, 1–2. 
11 Ibid., 4–5. 
12 Elizabeth Cousens, vice president of the International Peace Academy; David Harland, director of 
change management in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
13 Elizabeth Cousens and David Harland, “Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Twenty-First-
Century Peace Operations, 118–122. 
14 Daniel Druckman, professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University. 
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malicious peace operation deaths in the fifteen years since the Dayton Accords were 
signed.15  However, efforts to rebuild and reconfigure Bosnian society, lessen ethnic 
hostilities and suspicions, and resolve the sources of the conflict have proven far less 
effective.  They conclude that one of the primary reasons is that although the Accords 
established a national government, Bosnia was partitioned into two semi-autonomous 
entities with essentially separate government systems and institutions.  This led to a 
superficial reunification of the state, “more a veneer than reality.”  An ineffective central 
government and ethnic partition have further undermined state-building efforts and 
prevented a long-term settlement of the conflict.16 
2. Institutionalist View 
 Some authors take the position that establishing strong institutions is the critical 
factor in the success of peace operations.  The Quest for Viable Peace17 reaches this 
conclusion and offers recommendations to achieving this objective based on lessons 
learned from peace operations in the Balkans.  The editors and authors believe viable 
peace can only be achieved when the ability of domestic institutions to resolve conflict 
peacefully eclipses the power of obstructionist forces, marking a shift from imposed 
stability to self-sustaining peace.  In order to attain this goal peace operations must 
transform the sources of violent conflict by recognizing, confronting, and overcoming the 
motivation and means for conducting actions in opposition to the peace process.  
Furthermore, international security can only be enhanced if initial military force is 
followed by a comprehensive effort to build a government and institutions capable of 
running their state in compliance with and in support of international norms.  Achieving 
this goal requires establishing a system of governance based on nonviolent competition; 
demilitarizing or subordinating extra-governmental paramilitary forces to legitimate state  
 
                                                 
15 Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010), 176–179. 
16 Ibid., 189–190. 
17 Jock Covey et al., editors, The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for 
Conflict Transformation (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005). 
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authority; establishing a system of justice that serves the public (including minorities) and 
applies the law equitably; and creating functional, formal economies that provide the 
revenue required for the state to function.18 
 According to contributors Hawley and Skocz,19 the first step in achieving these 
goals is robust advanced political-military planning to harmonize the diverse military and 
civilian efforts into a comprehensive strategy for achieving viable peace.  This is required 
in order to integrate political, security, rule-of-law, and economic lines of effort, address 
contentious policy issues to avoid policy gaps and disconnects on the ground, and 
motivate the international community to commit to a long-term mobilization of 
substantial amounts of personnel and resources required for successful stability 
operations.20  Covey21 adds that a mission’s success in achieving a viable peace will also 
be impacted by how effective the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG), the custodian of the peace process, is at guiding the transformation of conflict 
between rivals in the postwar period.  He must be able to overcome the tensions and 
shortcomings within the international community, bring civilian and military components 
together as a coherent team, and align all efforts of the mission with the “primacy of the 
peace process.”22 
 Regarding the rule of law, Hartz, Mercean, and Williamson23 believe lessons 
learned in Bosnia and Kosovo emphasize that capacity building should be holistic, the 
mandate should provide adequate authority, international integration of effort is essential, 
                                                 
18 Richard H. Solomon, “Foreword,” in The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and 
Strategies for Conflict Transformation, xi–xii. 
19 Leonard R. Hawley, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Dennis Skocz, former 
Director of the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping at the U.S. State Department. 
20 Len Hawley and Dennis Skocz, “Advanced Political-Military Planning: Laying the Foundation for 
Achieving Viable Peace,” in The Quest for Viable Peace, 37. 
21 Jock Covey, former Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 
22 Jock Covey, “The Custodian of the Peace Process,” in The Quest for Viable Peace, 77. 
23 Halvor A. Hartz, former Police Commissioner of UNMIK; Laura Mercean, former UNMIK 
Department of Judicial Affairs lawyer; Clint Williamson, former trial attorney at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
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end-dates are counterproductive, and capacity building should lead directly to local 
“ownership.”24  These efforts should all be geared toward reducing the impunity of 
obstructionists and increasing the capacity of the legal system, because this will lead to a 
turning point in institutionalizing the rule of law and moving the conflict from imposed 
stability to viable and ultimately self-sustaining peace.25  Blair, Eyre, Salome, and 
Wasserstrom26 emphasize the importance of developing a legitimate political economy 
and addressing political-economic incentives for continued conflict.  An integrated effort 
must be made to shift from a political economy of conflict, where economic transactions 
take place in the illicit marketplace, the state is captured by a criminalized elite sustained 
by illicit revenue, and social conflict is manipulated to “legitimize” the regime, to a 
political economy of self-sustaining peace where the formal economy supports the mass 
of society, which in turn pays taxes to the state and thereby provides resources back to 
society.27 
 Dziedzic28 and Hawley conclude that all of these strategies must be linked 
together to address the core sources of internal conflict, including war aims that remain 
unmet, militant extremism, lawless rule, and a criminalized political economy that fuels 
hostilities.  Integrating mechanisms must be established to link together these 
interdependent lines of effort, including consensus top-down policy guidance, unified 
direction, and genuine civil-military partnerships, integrated executive leadership, a 
strategic mission plan, integration of military and policy operations, police and other rule-
of-law activities, and political and economic strategies.29  The necessity for integrating 
                                                 
24 Halvor A. Hartz and Laura Mercean, with Clint Williamson, “Safeguarding a Viable Peace: 
Institutionalizing the Rule of Law,” in The Quest for Viable Peace, 162–163. 
25 Ibid., 167. 
26 Stephanie A. Blair, former UNMIK municipal administrator; Dana Eyre, former Senior Policy 
Advisor to the Deputy SRSG for UNMIK; Bernard Salome, former Head of the UN's Economic Policy 
Office in Kosovo; James Wasserstrom, Head of UNMIK's Office Overseeing Publicly Owned Enterprises. 
27 Stephanie A. Blair, Dana Eyre, Bernard Salome, and James Wasserstrom, “Forging a Viable Peace: 
Developing A Legitimate Political Economy,” in The Quest for Viable Peace, 207–209. 
28 Michael J. Dziedzic, former UNMIK strategic planner. 
29 Blair, Eyre, Salome, and Wasserstrom, The Quest for Viable Peace, 258–264. 
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the interdependent lines of effort is illustrated by the fact that relief operations often need 
protection from security forces, the military depends on the diplomatic process to provide 
a peace to keep, criminal-political power structures must be denied control of judicial 
processes, and demobilized soldiers need jobs to convince them not to return to armed 
violence.30 
3. Realist Perspective 
 There is a body of literature on peace operations that offers a realist perspective.  
For the Balkans, a prime example is Gibbs’ First Do No Harm.31  Gibbs attempts to show 
that previous studies have misrepresented the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, and he takes a 
generally critical view of humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia.  He 
disagrees with the commonly held belief that Yugoslavia broke up and was engulfed by 
war due to internal factors, or that the international community, through its initial 
inaction, allowed major acts of genocide to occur.  He also attempts to debunk the view 
that America was late to intervene because the conflict did not threaten its national 
interests, and that when the U.S. finally did become involved, it led to the resolution of 
the humanitarian crises in Bosnia.32 
 According to Gibbs, most Western assessments of the Yugoslav wars 
overemphasized the importance of Serb aggression in order to justify military 
interventions focused almost entirely against the Serbs.  His opinion is that other ethnic 
groups share at least as much of the blame for Yugoslavia’s disintegration, as does 
Yugoslavia’s financial crisis, which began in the late 1970s and was worsened by the 
meddling of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).33  Gibbs believes that Croatian 
President Tudjman was just as racist and aggressive as Serbian President Milosevic, and 
the persecution of Serbs in Croatia was as brutal as atrocities committed by the Serbs.  In 
                                                 
30 Blair, Eyre, Salome, and Wasserstrom, The Quest for Viable Peace, 245. 
31 David N. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009). 
32 Ibid., 1–2. 
33 Ibid., 46. 
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addition, stubborn Slovenian and Croatian self-interest motivated their secession, causing 
Yugoslavia’s demise and leading to war.  Furthermore, the structural adjustment 
programs imposed by the IMF beginning in 1979 were focused on debt repayment and 
ignored their negative social and political consequences, creating the conditions that 
fueled ethnic hatreds and further promoted disintegration and violence.34 
 Gibbs states that the U.S. originally allowed the European powers (primarily 
Germany) to handle the situation in Yugoslavia not because it was trying to avoid the role 
of the world’s policeman and therefore gave Europe the opportunity to show that it could 
take care of its own affairs, but because it was preoccupied with Desert Storm and the 
breakup of the Soviet Union.35  He also refutes the generally accepted position that 
Germany became involved only after the conflict broke out, and then only through 
diplomatic maneuvering.  Gibbs states that Germany encouraged Croatian nationalists 
and prepared them for independence months before the war, and its recognition of 
Slovenia’s independence in December 1991 and Croatia’s in January 1992 terminated the 
existence of Yugoslavia and brought instability and violence to the region. 
 Germany’s assertive actions and the dire consequences led the U.S. to reconsider 
its lack of involvement in the Balkans.  The U.S. was concerned that Germany could 
become a dominant power in Europe and beyond, and that this would go against 
American interests and threaten U.S. hegemony.36  The Bush administration decided to 
commit itself to the highly visible conflict in Bosnia and side with the Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims) and Bosnian President Izetbegovic’s government.  The U.S. then encouraged 
Izetbegovic to seek independence before a political settlement could be achieved, thereby 
guaranteeing the violence that followed.  America did so to intentionally undermine the 
European Community’s efforts at mediation and thereby maintain the major political and 
economic advantages from its hegemonic position in Europe.  Despite objections from 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. eventually had to turn to military intervention in order 
                                                 
34 Gibbs, First Do No Harm, 75. 
35 Ibid., 76. 
36 Ibid., 105. 
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to support its Muslim clients and prevent a major loss of credibility.  Gibbs’ view is that 
these decisions could not have been based on humanitarian motives because it would 
have been far better, from a humanitarian standpoint, if the Western powers had instead 
tried to preserve the unity of the Yugoslav federation.37 
4. Functional Critique 
 Representing the body of work that provides a functional critique of how peace 
operations can be improved, Perito’s Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? 
takes this approach by evaluating operations in the Balkans.38  Perito states that the War 
on Terrorism has made it critical for the U.S. to have the ability to effectively establish 
sustainable security in postconflict societies.  The fact that Al Qaeda found sanctuary in 
countries like Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Bosnia supports the claim that unstable 
postconflict states pose a direct threat to U.S. national security.  The U.S. must now 
intervene in unstable locations not traditionally considered vital to American national 
interests, and this requires the ability to project U.S. power in a way that quickly restores 
stability and creates an environment conducive to postconflict reconstruction and 
reconciliation.  The U.S. can no longer afford to be unprepared for missions it does not 
desire, and needs new forces and a new approach to post-conflict intervention to 
effectively deal with rogue states and international terrorism.  These modern peace 
operations require police activities such as investigating crimes and dealing with civil 
disturbances and urban violence, and military forces cannot and should not be made 
responsible for performing these functions.39 
 Perito’s answer to the problem of creating sustainable security in postconflict 
environments is a U.S. Stability Force comprised of a robust military component and 
effective civilian constabulary, policing, and law enforcement elements (lawyers, judges, 
corrections officers, etc.) to maintain public order and security.  Such a force would help 
                                                 
37 Gibbs, First Do No Harm, 138–139. 
38 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him? America's Search for a 
Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, D.C.: Unites States Institute of Peace Press, 2004). 
39 Ibid., 323–324. 
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prevent a security gap between the end of a conflict and the establishment of a 
democratic government capable of guaranteeing public order through the rule of law.  It 
would do so by bringing together all the elements required for achieving sustainable 
security, providing a smooth transition from warfighting to institution building, 
establishing police and judicial authority from the outset, instituting the rule of law to 
create an environment hospitable to political, economic, and social reconstruction, and 
allowing for better interoperability with similar regional organizations.  However, 
creating this force would require extensive congressional involvement, new authorizing 
legislation, and new funding.  Furthermore, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, whose resources, influence and prestige would be vital to creating this 
force, would have to overcome their understandable reluctance to engage in stability 
operations.  Most importantly, the White House would have to lead this effort and 
establish a “peacekeeping czar” on the National Security Council staff.40 
 Perito puts the most weight on the rule of law because he considers it the 
foundation that facilitates an environment conducive to economic, political, and social 
development.  His focus is on developing a competent police force and corrections 
system as well as an independent judicial system that works under the rule of law.  Due to 
the importance of such institutions to post-conflict reconstruction, he emphasizes quickly 
establishing these capabilities with international forces and then transitioning to domestic 
institutions as soon as they can handle the responsibility.  This is because a post-conflict 
society usually cannot produce institutions that meet the qualities of legitimacy, 
representativeness, and professionalism.  The critiques that Perito points out in the 
conduct of modern peace operations are generally in line with most current literature on 
the subject and add more weight to the argument that post-conflict operations must focus 
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military and civilian missions and actors, and actively supporting those in favor of the 
peace operation’s mission while undermining spoilers opposed to the establishment of 
sustainable security.41 
5. Evaluation 
 Comparing the schools of thought in this literature review reveals several 
recurring themes on peace operations in general and the Balkans and Bosnia in specific.  
The first is that modern post-Cold War peace operations, such as in the Balkans, must be 
prepared to operate in inhospitable environments and take responsibility for 
administering the state post-conflict.  Second, stopping violent conflict is only the first 
step in peace operations; post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction, and reconciliation are 
equally important to furthering national, regional, and international security.  Third, some 
form of long-term sustainable security should be the overriding objective of peace 
operations.  Comprehensive security, a functioning legal economy, a legitimate and 
effective government, and the rule of law are all critical objectives towards achieving this 
goal.  Fourth, the international community must make a long-term commitment to 
supporting peace operations and empowering and resourcing their missions so they can 
effectively carry out their mandates.  Fifth, there must be an emphasis on building local 
partner capacity, as viable long-term peace cannot be achieved until domestic institutions 
are capable of independently running their state and peacefully resolving conflict.  
Finally, all aspects of peace operations must be harmonized to ensure they support each 
other and the ultimate goal of sustainable security. 
 There are also several areas in which the literature takes contrasting views.  For 
example, although there is general agreement over the conditions required for 
establishing sustainable security, the authors tend to disagree over which conditions are 
most important.  Perito takes the position that the rule of law facilitates all other end-
states, while Gibbs focuses more on economics, and others favor security or government.  
Regarding the cause of violent conflict in the Balkans, Gibbs represents the contrarian 
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view that the catalyst was external, specifically the IMF’s mismanagement of 
Yugoslavia’s financial crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, while most others consider internal 
factors, such as ethnic tensions and disagreements over sovereignty, to be the primary 
causes of war.  Furthermore, while the majority of authors believe peace operations have 
been instrumental in stopping and preventing bloodshed and working towards sustainable 
security in the former Yugoslavia, Gibbs’ view is that international involvement has 
actually exacerbated the situation and undermined progress towards reconciliation and 
reconstruction. 
 In reviewing the literature, there appears to be several aspects of the peace 
operations in the Balkans that could benefit from further analysis.  For example, although 
most of the literature emphasizes a number of objectives required to achieve long-term 
sustainable security, it largely glosses over the potentially critical goals associated with 
improving the population’s social well-being.  A number of the authors also stress the 
importance of promoting legality and legitimacy in all aspects of reconstruction and 
stabilization, however they barely touch on the role of organized crime in undermining 
these efforts.  Finally, despite the fact that there are repeated references to the benefits of 
preemptively addressing potential causes of conflicts before they escalate to violence, 
there is minimal mention of the only example of such an operation, the UN Preventive 
Deployment to Macedonia (UNPREDEP).  This thesis will attempt to address these 
shortfalls by evaluating the impact of the Dayton Accords on social well-being in Bosnia, 
the ability of peace operations to deal with Bosnian organized crime during and after the 
war, and the effectiveness of the UN preventive operation in Macedonia. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
 This thesis uses two primary methods of analysis: the Strategic Framework for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction found in the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction,42 and a broader evaluation based on an operation’s ability to accomplish 
its assigned mission and promote the development of its host nation.  The Strategic 
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Framework was selected because it was developed by a collaboration between the United 
States Institute of Peace and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute; 
it takes a comprehensive view of peace operations; it is current (published in 2009) and 
therefore takes into account the experiences and lessons of post-Cold War peace 
operations; and it is based on the first comprehensive set of shared principles for building 
sustainable peace, which is generally considered the overriding long-term goal of peace 
missions.  This framework is based on five desired end-states, including social well-
being, the rule of law, a sustainable economy, a safe and secure environment, and stable 
governance, and the conditions necessary to achieving these end states.  Chapter III of 
this thesis uses this framework as its primary method of analysis for social well-being.  
Chapters IV and V will use applicable portions of the framework to provide a common 
reference point on organized crime and UNPREDEP for the findings in this thesis. 
 The sources used in this thesis cover a broad range of literature, from scholarly 
books and journals to first-hand accounts and memoirs regarding the wars and peace 
operations in the former Yugoslavia.  Furthermore, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) literature and statistical data, UN resolutions and Secretary General reports, 
status reports from the peace operations themselves, European Union (EU) progress 
reports, Congressional Research Service reports, military manuals and directives, and 
reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International are all evaluated to provide a comprehensive analysis and 
viewpoint.  The abundance of material on the subject was filtered to provide a spectrum 
of viewpoints of the most thorough and well-supported literature covering the entire 
timeframe from the outbreak of the Balkan conflicts to the current day. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 In order to lay the foundation for these case studies, a background narrative is 
provided on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, associated wars of secession, and consequent 
deployment of international peace operations, with an emphasis on Bosnia, the central 
role of the U.S., and the formulation and implementation of the Dayton Accords. 
 When Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, first visited 
its republican capitals in 1989, his message was clear: “Yugoslavia no longer enjoyed the 
geopolitical importance that the United States had given it during the Cold War.”43  
Formerly the model for a more politically and economically open style of communism, it 
had been surpassed by reforms in Hungary and Poland.  Furthermore, human rights were 
playing a bigger role in American foreign policy, and Yugoslavia’s record was less than 
admirable.  The U.S. would continue to support Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial 
integrity, and unity, but would “strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by force.”44  
However, it soon became clear that Slobodan Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia and 
later Serbia, was only interested in a unified Yugoslavia dominated by Serbs and planned 
to use the Yugoslav Army, whose officer corps was over half Serbian, to attain that goal.  
If Yugoslavia did break up, his alternate plan was to incorporate the Serbian majority 
regions into a “Greater Serbia.”  This hardline approach did not sit well with the other 
republics, and only fueled separatist desires. 
 Zimmermann reported to Washington that Yugoslavia could not breakup 
peacefully due to the ethnic hatred being sown by Milosevic, and the ethnic diversity 
within the majority of the republics.45  Yugoslavia’s disintegration would lead to extreme 
violence and possibly war, so he recommended supporting at least a loose unity 
accompanied by democratic development.  President George H.W. Bush’s administration 
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also agreed with the European view that a unified Yugoslavia would set the right example 
for other nations breaking free from the former Soviet yolk.46  America and most of 
Western Europe adopted this policy, and in June 1991 Secretary of State James Baker 
was dispatched to Belgrade to make it clear that America preferred for Yugoslavia to 
remain a unified state.  He clarified however that Washington opposed any use of force, 
and that: “If you force the United States to choose between unity and democracy, we will 
always choose democracy.”47  Although Zimmermann agreed with Baker’s message, he 
believed it came six months too late due to America’s earlier preoccupation with the Gulf 
War.  Within weeks of Baker’s visit, Slovenia and Croatia had declared their 
independence, followed by Macedonia in September 1991, and Bosnia in March 1992. 
 As Zimmermann had predicted, the dissolution of Yugoslavia would rapidly 
devolve into a brutally violent conflict, which challenged the established role of UN 
peacekeeping in the post-Cold War international order.  The UN became involved in the 
crisis in Yugoslavia in mid-1991, when Germany’s domination of European Council 
mediation efforts led France and Britain to push for UN involvement, where they had 
special status in the Security Council.  On 25 September 1991 the Security Council voted 
unanimously under Chapter VII to impose an arms embargo on Yugoslavia and invited 
the Secretary General to offer his assistance to the ongoing negotiation efforts.  The UN 
was seen as the right venue because it was considered to have the experience and 
resources for dealing with such a mission, whereas NATO’s military assets were 
designed for forceful intervention, not consensual peacekeeping.48  By late 1991, the 
international policy towards Yugoslavia became a strategy of containment and indirect 
pressure aimed at bringing the parties to a settlement through an arms embargo, economic 
and political sanctions, and consensual field operations to alleviate civilian hardships.  
This was an odd midpoint between disengagement and forceful intervention, which was 
not considered a solution to the conflict but the least unacceptable of many poor options. 
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 In early 1992, the UN deployed its UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to 
Croatia, tasked by the Security Council to be an “interim arrangement to create the 
conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of 
the Yugoslav crisis.”49  Although UNPROFOR’s primary mission was to protect the 
population with the support of the warring parties, a lack of cooperation meant that in 
reality UNPROFOR could do little to stop violence against civilians.  The UN called for a 
return to normalcy through demilitarization, the return of displaced peoples, and 
restoration of law and order, but undermined its own plan by not giving UNPROFOR the 
authority to use force to achieve these aims.  Once UNPROFOR realized it could not 
attain these objectives, it refocused its efforts on more realistic goals and was able to help 
sustain hundreds of thousands of refugees, protect small numbers of minorities, and 
temporarily prevent a larger conflict by helping maintain a fragile ceasefire.50  However, 
UNPROFOR could not find a way to establish a durable political settlement in Croatia 
and after Sarajevo declared its independence in March the conflict quickly spread to 
Bosnia, only on an even larger scale.51 
 When UNPROFOR entered Bosnia in force in September 1992, its mission was 
not to monitor a ceasefire or impose peace, but to keep the population alive while 
diplomatic efforts to end the war continued.  It had complex mandates that were often 
inconsistent, exceeded its resources, and did a better job of reconciling great power 
objectives than addressing the problems on the ground.  Because Bosnia was an active 
conflict, it taxed the UN command, control, communications, and tactical intelligence 
structure to a far greater extent than any previous mission.  Most importantly, 
UNPROFOR never gained the full support of either side of the conflict because the 
Bosnian government condemned it for failing to protect safe areas and the Serbs believed 
it was cooperating with the Bosniaks and Croats at their expense.52  Although 
UNPROFOR did an adequate job of providing humanitarian relief to over 2.2 million 
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civilians and overseeing the de-militarization of small stretches of the Muslim-Croat 
confrontation line, its primary impact was shifting the war from a quick Serb victory and 
bilateral division of Bosnia to a slow war of attrition that gave the Muslims and Croats 
time to balance and even exceed Serb military power.53  By August 1995 the untenable 
position on the ground prompted UNPROFOR’s major troop contributors to shift its 
stance from humanitarian intervention to peace enforcement and join NATO in forcing 
the Serbs to the negotiating table. 
 From the American standpoint, Bosnia presented the difficult question of whether, 
when, and how to intervene in other people’s wars.  Getting involved in Bosnia appeared 
to be a matter of choice rather than necessity, and the high level of complexity and 
brutality, coupled with the cost and uncertainty of success, weighed in favor of non-
intervention.  Baker famously summed up the administration’s view by stating that 
America did not “have a dog in that fight.”54  Furthermore, Bush preferred that the 
Europeans and the UN handle the Bosnia situation without direct American intervention, 
allowing him to turn his attention to domestic issues in preparation for the upcoming 
elections.  European leaders seemed confident and eager to resolve the conflict on their 
own, in part inspired by the post-Cold War resurgence of France’s Gaullist vision of a 
powerful, self-sufficient Europe.  However, Europe’s attempts at an even-handed, non-
accusatory approach paralyzed Western policy, as did the disagreement between the U.S., 
England, and France over the legitimacy and value of military action.  These differing 
viewpoints sparked a strain in transatlantic relations reminiscent of the 1956 Suez Crisis, 
and appeared to be the first stages of a post-Cold War fissure between allies that no 
longer had a common existential threat.55 
 By the summer of 1992, media coverage of the Bosnian War had accurately 
conveyed the grizzly nature of the conflict, and the American public was being exposed 
to stories of Bosniaks being murdered and driven from their homes as part of a Serbian 
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ethnic cleansing campaign aimed at seizing large swaths of Bosnian territory.  There were 
even reports of concentration camps, invoking memories of Nazi death camps.  The Bush 
administration’s inaction became an easy target for the Clinton campaign, which 
promised that it would act forcefully to stop the conflict, even pledging American 
military, political, and economic power.  Still, Vietnam-era liberals were not comfortable 
with the thought of a significant military commitment.  Within the Bush administration, 
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly opposed military 
intervention in Bosnia and made direct comparisons to Vietnam, stating there were no 
clear military goals.56  National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger also argued against intervention in Bosnia, believing the U.S. 
would be drawn into a political and military quagmire.  There was a fear that American 
soldiers would become entangled in a costly war that would end in a humiliating defeat.57 
 Once elected, Clinton realized the extent to which such action could incur 
national blood, treasure, and political capital.  Having read Robert Kaplan’s Balkan 
Ghosts.58  Clinton apparently subscribed to Kaplan’s view that the Bosnian conflict was 
caused by “ancient ethnic hatreds” that America could not hope to resolve, and was leery 
of committing himself to the crisis.  In May 1993, Clinton sent Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to Europe to look into a potential way ahead on the Bosnian issue.  European 
allies were looking for American guidance and leadership, but instead received a 
Secretary of State who said he was only in “listening mode.”  The trip was therefore 
ineffectual and the administration made no progress towards establishing an American or 
transatlantic policy on Bosnia.  Although the administration supported UN Security 
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settlement with its European allies, it was not enough to make a real difference.  The 
Clinton administration’s initial attempts at resolving the Bosnian conflict were 
ineffective.59 
 The Bosnian War was seen by the Clinton administration as an obstacle to 
capitalizing on America’s victory in the Cold War to promote the White House’s goal of 
a stable, secure and democratic Europe united with the former Warsaw Pact members.  
The transatlantic alliance’s inability to end the war, or even agree on a unified strategy, 
had undermined NATO and prevented it from being a crucial tool in achieving Clinton’s 
vision for Europe.  In November 1994, Clinton’s top advisers recommended putting 
Bosnia on the backburner and focusing on strengthening the NATO alliance, but by early 
1995, the administration realized that resolving the Bosnian conflict was integral to 
restoring NATO’s unity and credibility.60 
 In July 1995, Serbian forces overran the town of Srebrenica, a UN-declared “safe 
area,” and killed over eight thousand Bosniak men and boys while the undermanned UN 
peacekeeping force stood aside.  This was the largest-scale massacre seen in Europe since 
World War II, and it convinced the Clinton administration, which had done nothing to 
stop the genocide in Rwanda the year before, to take a leading role in ending the Bosnian 
conflict.  The White House sponsored a NATO policy threatening increased airstrikes in 
retaliation for continued Serb aggression and did away with a debilitating “dual-key” 
process requiring UN approval of bombing targets.  Serbs forces soon shelled a crowded 
Sarajevo marketplace and NATO followed through on its threat by launching a major air 
operation against the Serbs.61  The Srebrenica tragedy also galvanized American popular 
opinion for engagement in the Bosnian War and Congress consequently voted to lift an 
arms embargo against Bosnia with veto-proof majorities.  This also motivated the White 
House to engage in a wholesale policy review on Bosnia, culminating in August with a 
more involved, forceful strategy based on shifting the military advantage away from the 
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Serbs by lifting the arms embargo, training and equipping the Bosniaks and Croats, and 
threatening major NATO airstrikes, while at the same time incentivizing a peace 
settlement by proposing to revise territorial boundaries and constitutional principles.62 
 Yet, when the Clinton administration attempted to get buy-in from its European 
counterparts, the general consensus was that diplomatic efforts would fail.  However, 
three ongoing developments significantly bolstered Clinton’s policy.  First, Operation 
Storm, the Croat-led, Bosniak-supported offensive had reduced Serb territorial control to 
less than fifty percent of Bosnia.  Second, Milosevic declared he would be the Serb 
representative at any peace negotiations, sidelining the more hard-line Bosnian Serb 
leadership.  Finally, NATO’s air campaign exposed cracks in the Bosnian Serb military 
and proved that it was not invincible.  This ultimately brought them to the negotiating 
table.  In Washington, there were two primary interpretations of the new Bosnia policy.  
The popular view was that its purpose was to quickly end the conflict to ensure it was not 
a thorn in Clinton’s side during the 1996 presidential elections.  However those involved 
in the peace negotiation process, such as Richard Holbrooke,63 believed the primary 
objective was to establish a secure, long-term peace within the framework of a unified, 
sovereign Bosnia.  These divergent views would significantly impact the results of the 
November 1995 peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio and the level of U.S. commitment to 
guaranteeing their implementation.64 
 According to Holbrooke his team wanted to achieve as much as possible, 
including a lasting peace, and not back away from matters that would be difficult to 
achieve.  However, the means for implementing these provisions were limited by 
powerful voices in Washington who were primarily concerned with quickly ending the 
violence in Bosnia.  The result was a narrow mandate and one year deadline for NATO’s 
military Implementation Force (IFOR), a severely constrained Office of the High 
Representative (OHR), no identified source of funding, and no plan for cross-agency 
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coordination.  All of these factors created an “enforcement gap” that would hamper the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords’ ambitious goals.65  The saving grace for the 
Accords was that they were not etched in stone, allowing them to be modified over time 
to address their shortcomings and deal with developments on the ground. 
 After Clinton’s reelection in November 1996, he decided to extend the military 
mission for another eighteen months, but with a smaller troop presence renamed the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR).  Its limited mandate remained unchanged, which was to 
enforce the Dayton Accords’ military stipulations and establish an environment secure 
enough to allow for Bosnia’s rebuilding.  In his second term, Clinton revamped his senior 
staff, and Madeleine Albright, the new Secretary of State, believed the best way to 
achieve Dayton’s broad objectives was by expanding SFOR’s mandate to directly support 
civilian efforts focused on Bosnia’s long-term development.  By May 1997, Albright had 
sold Clinton on her position on Bosnia, and the administration’s emphasis shifted from 
simply preventing another conflict to proactively supporting civilian missions such as 
arresting war criminals, protecting returning refugees, and demilitarizing and vetting 
local police forces.  Furthermore, in December Clinton announced that a U.S. military 
force would remain in Bosnia until it had achieved sustainable security marked by a 
robust ceasefire, legitimate police force, and effective economic, political and judicial 
reforms.66  In December 1997, the authority of the OHR was significantly augmented 
through the implementation of the “Bonn Powers,” which allowed the High 
Representative to remove obstructionists from the government, impose legislation that 
supported the goals of the reconstruction effort, and veto government decisions that he 
deemed counterproductive. 
 These measures helped make the peacebuilding mission more effective, allowing 
it to prevent a recurrence of large-scale violence and make some progress on post-conflict 
issues such as joint institutions, freedom of movement, minority returnees, electoral law, 
and the integration of the Bosnian police.  The decade after Dayton saw no widespread 
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violence, the repair of much of Bosnia’s infrastructure, the resettlement of approximately 
one million refugees, a number of alleged war criminals sent to the Hague (including 
Milosevic), and four rounds of relatively successful general elections.  On the other hand, 
the results of ethnic cleansing had been consolidated, not reversed; Bosnia was not a 
viable, self-supporting state; state institutions worked poorly and were generally not 
trusted by the population; ethnic allegiances still transcended a national identity; and the 
economy depended on foreign aid, lagged behind the rest of the region, and remained 
heavily criminalized.67  Today, fifteen years after the cessation of armed conflict, it 
would be worthwhile to reevaluate the legacy of the Dayton Accords .  The following 
chapter will attempt to do so by assessing Dayton’s impact on stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts to improve social well-being, a critical litmus test of a nation’s 
post-conflict recovery. 
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III. DAYTON’S IMPACT ON BOSNIA’S SOCIAL WELL-BEING 
 Although social well-being is regularly mentioned in literature on peace 
operations as an important objective on the road to attaining post-conflict sustainable 
security, it nevertheless tends to take a backseat to security, rule of law, governance, and 
economics.  Much of the work evaluating peace operations in the Balkans is similarly 
lacking in this regard.  This chapter attempts to partially fill this gap by studying how the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords has impacted Bosnia’s social well-being.  This 
will be done through an assessment of the Dayton-mandated peace operation’s 
effectiveness at promoting social well-being as prescribed in The Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction, which defines social well-being as “an end state in 
which basic human needs are met and people are able to coexist peacefully in 
communities with opportunities for advancement.”68  It is critical to attain this end state 
because without it social instability persists, stabilization and reconstruction efforts are 
undermined, and peace cannot be permanently sustained.  This analysis will be based on 
an evaluation of the peace operation’s ability to attain the conditions necessary to 
achieving social-well being in post-conflict Bosnia, which include access to and delivery 
of basic needs services and education, right of return and resettlement of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, and social reconstruction.69 
A. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1. Access To and Delivery of Basic Needs Services 
 Attaining the condition of access to and delivery of basic needs services means 
the population receives appropriate and quality assistance and has access to water, food 
shelter, and health services of sufficient quantity and quality to guarantee survival and the 
right to “life with dignity.”  The basic structure for obtaining such necessities is 
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commonly destroyed or incapacitated during conflict or may never have been adequate, 
and therefore rebuilding the physical infrastructure is critical to enabling the long-term 
provision of these services.  Ensuring access to these services is vital to the survival of 
post-conflict populations, maintaining livelihoods over the long term, and promoting the 
legitimacy of the state.70 
 The international community has done an overall satisfactory job of rebuilding 
Bosnia’s infrastructure since 1995, and the majority of the Bosnian population receives 
adequate assistance and has access to basic needs such as water, food, and at least 
rudimentary healthcare.  Common indicators, such as infant mortality and life 
expectancy, support this position.  According to the CIA World Fact Book, Bosnia 
currently has an infant mortality rate of 8.88 per 1000, which is on the higher end for 
Europe (the EU averages 5.61), but well below the world average of 44.13.  Bosnia’s life 
expectancy of 78.66 years is in line with the EU average of 78.82 and well above the 
world average of 66.12.71  These figures have improved from 11.6 and 75.47, 
respectively, at the end of the conflict in 1995.72  However, although mainstream society 
has access to basic services, there are portions of the Bosnian population whose needs are 
not being met.  For example, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (hereafter 
referred to jointly as displaced persons) face serious discrimination in access to 
healthcare, especially in areas where they are in the minority.  Furthermore, although 
Bosnia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the nation’s 
fragmented legal and financial framework means the disabled often do not have access to 
health protection and assistance benefits.73 
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 Bosnia’s public health policy has made little progress, especially in coordination 
between various ministries of health and international organizations.  There has been no 
real strategic development, a roadmap drafted in 2008 has not yet been adopted, and a 
state-level strategic plan for health development is yet to be drafted.  Furthermore, 
Bosnia’s fragmented institutional and legislative framework has led to inadequate health 
insurance coverage and poor quality healthcare services, including nearly non-existent 
mental health services.  Bosnia is supposed to be the home for a Regional Center for 
Cooperation in the field of mental health, but the center is yet to be operational.  There is 
a state-level commission for adopting the World Health Organization’s International 
Health Regulations, but actual implementation has been problematic.  Similarly, although 
Bosnia has passed legislation to come more in line with EU requirements for health and 
safety at work, not all the cantons have adopted the relevant laws and minimal progress 
has been made at the entity level.74  A lack of cooperation between levels of government 
continues to hinder the development of coordinated approaches. 
2. Access To and Delivery of Education 
 Meeting the condition of access to and delivery of education means that there is 
system-wide development and reform to ensure equal access to quality and conflict-
sensitive education.  Ensuring the delivery of education during and after violent conflict 
is particularly important because it can help bring an end to and prevent the renewal of 
conflict by providing the population, children in particular, a source of stability and 
normalcy that can help them cope with conflict and its aftermath.  Education can also 
promote cultural and moral changes that transform sources of conflict and encourage 
peaceful coexistence, further the development of human and social capital, develop a 
stronger national identity, and promote sustainable development and peace.75 
 Bosnia has made some progress, at least on paper, in the realm of education.  This 
includes improved coordination between the state, entity, and canton level; an agreement 
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to establish a Council for General Education and a common core curriculum for pre-
school education; a standard rulebook for vocational schools; and a common early 
primary education textbook for Bosnian children living abroad.  However, education 
institutions are generally understaffed and underfunded, the education system is not 
geared to meet the needs of the labor market, and quality assurance measures need to be 
improved.  Furthermore, not all cantons have adopted a standard curriculum, little 
progress has been made on international statistical reporting requirements, and there is no 
national qualification framework.  Framework laws for higher, pre-school, and vocational 
education have not been implemented due to a lack of consensus between the Republika 
Srpska76 (RS) and Federation, preschool attendance at six percent is among the lowest in 
Europe, and displaced persons often do not have equal access to education.77 
 Despite the seriousness of these issues, which have led some to consider Bosnia’s 
educational system the worst in all of Europe,78 the biggest obstacle to Bosnia’s 
educational reform has been its inability to provide a uniform, quality education in 
ethnically diverse schools.  Many Bosniak and Bosnian Croat students attend school 
together, but are separated in the classroom and taught different lessons on history, 
geography, religion and language.79  The Federation has had minimal success in its 
attempts to restructure this “two schools under one roof” approach, which continues to 
create tensions at the community level.  In addition, the continuous development of 
mono-ethnic schools in both entities has led to further divisions in the education system 
and de facto segregation from a young age.80  The unique northeast district of Brcko is 
the only location where Bosniak, Serb, and Croat children are educated in the same 
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classes with an ethnic mix of teachers.81  This may offer a glimpse of what Bosnia’s 
educational system could look like, but only with an immense level of direct international 
involvement and support that would be untenable for the nation as a whole. 
3. Return and Resettlement of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons 
 Attaining the condition of the return and resettlement of refugees and internally 
displaced persons means people displaced from their homes have the opportunity to 
voluntarily and safely return to their homes or resettle into new homes, have access to 
unbiased property dispute resolution, and receive reintegration and rehabilitation support 
to help rebuild their livelihoods and contribute to the long-term economic and political 
development and rebuilding of the host nation.  Return and resettlement can promote the 
acceptance of an end to violent conflict, legitimize the new political order, and restore the 
society’s orderly, pre-conflict lifestyle.  Resolving nationality, residency, and property 
rights can also encourage a more effective, trustworthy, and durable relationship between 
citizens and the state.82 
 The Dayton Accords paid a significant amount of attention to the return of 
displaced persons, with an entire annex (VII) dedicated to resolving this problem.  One of 
the primary security concerns following the cessation of violence was for returnees.   
NATO bases such as Bratunac on the eastern border with Serbia were established in part 
to provide a sense of security for returnees.  Freedom of movement, critical to facilitating 
the return of displaced persons, was vastly improved by the Accords and the OHR.  
Annex II established a border with no physical boundaries along entity lines, and 
empowered IFOR/SFOR to remove illegal barricades and checkpoints.83  The Accords 
also promoted the return of real property, with a mandate in Annex VII leading to the 
creation of a Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees 
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(CRPC).  The CRPC built institutions for the implementation of property law, 
depoliticized the property-reclaiming process, and effectively drew on the resources of 
the international community to ensure that by the end of its mandate in 2003 more than 
ninety  percent of property claims had been resolved.84  These measures have led to the 
return of the vast majority of the over two million displaced persons uprooted by the 
war.85 
 Despite these apparent successes there is another side to the refugee story, 
brought on in large part by the partition of Bosnia into two legally and ethnically divided 
entities.  Although according to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) as of January 2010 there were only approximately 120,000 Bosnian displaced 
persons remaining,86 this figure can be misleading because in reality many registered 
returnees only returned to their prewar homes to claim legal rights to their property, sell, 
rent, or lock their homes, and return to a region where their ethnic group is in the 
majority.  There are several reasons for this, including the fact that those returning to 
areas where they are the minority have faced violence and persecution, and have 
generally not been well protected by the local authorities, including the police, who are 
composed of the local ethnic majority and often answer to nationalist politicians and 
elites.  Furthermore, where discrimination laws exist they are generally not sufficient or 
fully applied, and the majority of discrimination cases are still pending.  Ethnicity-based 
discrimination in employment, health services, and education is one of most serious 
obstacles to the return of displaced persons, without which long term return is not 
possible. 87 
 The returnee crisis is further highlighted by the fact that, according to Amnesty 
International, only 758 refugees and 216 IDPs actually returned to their pre-war Bosnian 
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homes in 2009.88  Besides the reasons already mentioned, many do not return because 
they fear war criminals may still live in their pre-war communities and occupy positions 
of power.  Furthermore, distribution of assistance to displaced persons lacks transparency 
and accountability, there is a lack of adequate housing, labor legislation and social 
security systems are fragmented between entities, and de-mining efforts have slowed due 
to a lack of funding.89  There have been some efforts to address these issues by 
developing a more effective, country-wide strategy for supporting the return process and 
properly implementing Annex VII of the Accords.  However, these revisions has been 
stalled in parliament over a disagreement between the Bosniaks, who want to commit 
more resources to returning displaced persons to their place of origin, and the Serbs, who 
prefer to divide resources between returning displaced persons to their place of origin and 
integrating them into the communities where they currently reside.90 
4. Social Reconstruction 
 The social reconstruction condition is advanced through inter- and intra-group 
reconciliation to address the remnants of violent conflict and community-based 
development to promote reconciliation and build societal links.  This condition is met 
when the population has achieved tolerance and peaceful co-existence, accepted a 
national identity that outweighs individual, sectarian, and communal differences, 
developed the ability and will to peacefully resolve disputes, adopted community 
institutions that bring society closer together, and addressed the legacy of past abuses.  
Post-conflict societies may have a lack of cohesion, participants in and victims of 
violence who have difficulty reintegrating into the community, and a lack of formal and 
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informal local institutions.  If these issues are not addressed through social 
reconstruction, individuals and communities may revert to violence to address unresolved 
grievances and disputes.91 
 The Dayton Accords did not establish a post-conflict environment conducive to 
pursuing social reconstruction.  First, the Accords did not address a primary issue 
underlying the three-year conflict, whether Bosnia should be partitioned or reintegrated.92  
Instead, the two largely autonomous entities and a weak state government promoted 
ethnic rivalry and partition, and did not give Sarajevo the power to effectively promote 
reconciliation and development programs.  The complex governmental system and 
fragmented legislature that are a legacy of Dayton further hamper social dialogue.93  
Furthermore, the Accords did not address the right of individual citizens or assign a lead 
organization to deal with human rights issues, and did not make provisions for any ethnic 
groups besides Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats to be represented at the state level.94  The 
following examples illustrate how these issues have stifled Bosnian efforts to promote 
social reconstruction. 
 At the state level, Bosnia has adopted a number of laws and conventions that, in 
theory, should help bolster the nation’s efforts at social reconstruction.  These include 
ratifying the 2005 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Convention on 
the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopting anti-
discrimination laws, including the primary elements of human rights law into the legal 
system, and implementing a legal framework aimed at minority protection.  However, the 
one aspect these measures have in common is that the state government has been unable 
to successfully promote their implementation and enforcement at the entity level or 
below, resulting in a lack of minority protection, representation in politics and media, or 
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access to employment, especially in the regional public sectors.95  Displaced persons 
returning to areas where they are the minority face discrimination in access to social 
rights and are prosecuted in far greater numbers for war crimes, further perpetuating 
ethnic divides and deterring social healing.96 
 Worsening relations between ethnic groups have further promoted segregation, 
with Serbs dominating the RS, Bosniaks rarely venturing outside the Federation, and 
Croats increasingly leaving Bosnia altogether to resettle in Croatia.  This is highlighted 
by a statement by the Roman Catholic bishop of Banja Luka, the de facto capital of the 
RS, that his predominantly Croat diocese has lost ninety percent of its prewar 
population.97  Furthermore, Bosnia’s practice of prohibiting anyone other than a Bosniak, 
Serb, or Croat from running for the federal Presidency or parliament violates 
international human rights law and continues to stifle inter-group relations.  In June 2009 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Bosnia discriminated against two 
Bosnian citizens, a Roma and Jew, by barring them from standing for public office 
because of their ethnicity.98  Another challenge has been the prosecution of war crimes, 
which has been unsatisfactory below the state level and undermined by nationalist 
politicians challenging official verdicts and convictions.  All of this has led to a 
degradation of ethnic relations and recent gains for nationalist ethnic political parties,99 
further reducing the probability of significant social reconstruction in Bosnia’s 
foreseeable future. 
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B. EVALUATION 
 The Dayton Accords and the peace operations they authorized were successful in 
improving certain aspects of Bosnia’s social well-being, especially those related to 
rapidly reestablishing the population’s access to basic necessities immediately post-
conflict.  However, fundamental flaws in the Accords have simultaneously undermined 
the state government’s ability to further improve the social well-being of its population.  
The significant power and autonomy given to the RS and Federation by the Accords at 
the expense of the state government has promoted the fragmentation of the state’s 
institutions and legislature, and worsened coordination between all levels of government.  
This has reduced the ability of the state government in Sarajevo to govern over the 
entities and Bosnia as a whole, enforce laws promoting social well-being, and 
demonstrate to the international community that it is capable of implementing the social 
reforms necessary to make progress towards membership in NATO, the EU, and other 
regional and international organizations critical to its long-term development. 
 These governmental weaknesses have severely constrained the long-term 
development of Bosnia’s social well-being.  Displaced persons, ethnic minorities, and the 
disabled frequently do not have adequate access to basic needs and services, and minimal 
progress has been made in implementing work health and safety standards and reforming 
the healthcare system.  The inability to provide access to and deliver uniform, quality 
education in ethnically diverse schools, exemplified by the “two schools under one roof” 
program, has led to an increase in mono-ethnic schools and further ethnic segregation.  
The return of displaced persons has been undermined by a fragmentation of labor 
legislation and social security systems between entities.  Minorities face violence and 
discrimination that forces them to move to areas where they are in the majority.  
Subsequently, less than 1000 of 120,000 displaced persons returned home in 2009.  
Finally, the state government’s inability to implement laws and conventions to promote 
social reconstruction at the entity level and below has undermined efforts to improve 
social dialogue and relations between ethnic groups, encouraging further segregation, the 
rise of nationalist ethnic parties, and political undermining of war crimes prosecution. 
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 These issues indicate that Bosnia is not yet ready to take responsibility for its 
social well-being.  The continued lack of a strong central government could further 
undermine ethnic reconciliation by preventing the adoption of universal, ethnically 
sensitive education; the implementation of laws ensuring minority rights and 
representation at all levels of government; and the promotion of tolerant, progress-
minded politicians, while emboldening ethno-nationalist, extremist spoilers.  The flaws of 
the Dayton Accords continue to undermine Bosnia’s social well-being and the final 
resolution of the conflict that devastated the nation with war and stifle its progress 
towards becoming a truly stable, sovereign state.  Ultimately, there can be no sustainable 
peace until the conditions for ensuring a population’s social well-being are met.  This 
requires parallel efforts to strengthen a fragile nation’s security, governance, economy, 
and rule of law.  One potential roadblock to these efforts is the illicit activity of organized 
crime.  Therefore, it is critical to understand the role criminal networks play in conflict 
and post-conflict environments and their possible impact on peacemaking and 
stabilization efforts.  The next chapter analyzes the relationship between organized crime 
and peace operations in Bosnia in order to further evaluate the international community’s 
effectiveness at attaining its long-term objective of sustainable peace in the Balkans. 
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IV. ORGANIZED CRIME AND PEACE OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA 
 Like the previous example with social well-being, a peace operation’s ability to 
deal with organized crime is another critical aspect of attaining its ultimate goal of 
sustainable peace that does not receive significant analysis in the literature analyzing the 
effectiveness of peace operations.  In order to help fill this gap, this chapter evaluates the 
association between organized crime and peace operations in Bosnia from the beginning 
of operations in 1992 to the present day.  Attention is given to how the interaction 
progresses through conflict, post-conflict, and long-term recovery, driven by a changing 
environment and evolving interests and objectives.  Both competing and, less commonly 
considered, symbiotic elements of the relationship are analyzed and illustrated through 
real-world examples.  Efforts at dealing with organized crime are evaluated based on the 
outcomes of decisions and actions taken by those involved in the peace operations and 
their effect on the promotion of the rule of law and a sustainable economy in Bosnia 
using the conditions set forth in Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction.100 
A. WAR, 1992–1995 
 The Western Balkans have a tradition of organized crime, fueled by their location 
as a convenient smuggling corridor from Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe.  
President Tito’s authoritarian regime held tight enough control over Yugoslavia to keep 
organized crime in check, but the economic downturn of the 1980s and the wars of the 
1990s were a catalyst for its resurgence.101  During the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia, 
international sanctions and the constraints of war forced the leadership of all three ethnic 
groups to rely on organized crime to perform essential services102 and the smuggling and 
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trafficking of people, arms, drugs, timber, and fuel became entrenched in Bosnian politics 
and business.  Due to the arms embargo, the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats turned to 
criminal networks for weapons and military equipment and Bosnian Serbs relied on 
smuggling and black marketing to fund their war effort.  All sides relied on armed gangs 
and paramilitary groups like “Arkan’s Tigers” and the “White Eagles,” who were 
involved in illicit trafficking and other illegal activities.103  These strengthened links 
between organized crime groups and government officials would prove to be a significant 
stumbling block to Bosnia’s postwar recovery.104 
 This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that UNPROFOR was a 
peacekeeping force sent into Bosnia when there was no peace to keep and the unforgiving 
conditions on the ground promoted and enabled cooperation with a broad range of local 
war entrepreneurs and powerbrokers, including smugglers and semi-private criminal 
combatants.  This illustrates the reality that peace operations can become deeply 
enmeshed in the illicit political economy of conflict in direct and indirect ways, often 
with a gamut of intentional and unexpected consequences.  Peace operations in Bosnia 
contributed to illicit business activities and illicit business played a role in achieving a 
number of peace operation goals, including helping provide basic services to the civilian 
population and bringing an end to the conflict.105 
 Peace operations can create a stable “business climate” favorable to illicit 
business, such as in besieged Sarajevo, where the UNPROFOR presence helped secure 
and stabilize the siege lines and airport, allowing them to become major smuggling 
points.  Another example is the UN-protected “safe areas” such as Bihac and Srebrenica, 
which became stable enough for clandestine trading.  The UN’s Sarajevo airlift and truck 
convoys for relief aid were unwittingly used to smuggle weapons, people, and currency, 
and were susceptible to bribery and “taxation” by the Serbs, with up to a quarter of the 
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aid ending up on the black market.  Some UNPROFOR personnel even became directly 
involved, taking bribes, transporting illegal goods, and becoming paid informants, money 
couriers, brokers/intermediaries, and consumers (primarily of prostitution).  Furthermore, 
UN economic sanctions and arms embargoes reduced supply and inflated prices, 
promoting cross-border black markets and closer ties between organized crime and the 
government, which became entrenched and persisted post-conflict.  This is illustrated by 
the 1991 UN arms embargo, which caused a boom in illegal arms smuggling, and the 
1992 economic sanctions enacted against the Milosevic regime, which severed formal 
regional trade but caused informal and criminal trade to fill the demand and flourish.106 
 Although organized crime is usually seen as an obstacle to peace operations 
because it helps create and sustain the material basis for war and reduce incentives for 
peace, in some circumstances it can also help peace operations attain their objectives.  
For example, the UNHCR rarely met its supply goals for humanitarian aid in Bosnia, but 
it realized the black market’s ability to help meet the population’s basic needs, and 
therefore officially opposed but tolerated its operations.  Bihac is a striking example.  The 
city suffered under siege conditions throughout much of the war, and although the 
UNHCR was not able to provide enough aid to ensure the survival of the inhabitants, 
somehow the population endured.  This was attributed to the locals’ black market 
connections with their Serbian enemies and the main smuggling route that went directly 
through UN-protected areas and siege lines.  Another example is that of “warlord” Fikret 
Abdic, who ran the Bihac region as his private fiefdom, signing trade agreements and 
charging “taxes” and transit fees on all sides.  In November 1992, he made an informal 
agreement with the French UNPROFOR battalion, agreeing to facilitate their operations 
and provide land for a base camp in exchange for UNPROFOR escorting 400 tons of his 
smuggled goods per week.  In 1993, only eleven percent of UNHCR aid arrived to Bihac, 
but Abdic moved three times that amount, 10,000 tons per month.  Abdic made a valid  
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point when he stated that “Everybody has accused me of war profiteering, but who else 
would have been able to bring these goods into Bihac?  Who else would have been able 
to break the blockade?”107 
 Illicit business can also help peace operations end a conflict, such as when arms 
smuggling shifts the military balance or breaks a stalemate, thereby creating the 
conditions for a negotiated peace.  In 1995, Croat and Bosniak military offensives, 
strengthened in part by black market weapons in violation of the UN arms embargo, 
reclaimed substantial ground from the Serbs, shrinking their territory to less than fifty 
percent of Bosnia and thereby helping force them to the negotiating table.  The arms 
smuggling networks that made this possible ranged in size from cottage industry to state-
sponsored, and were even supported by the peace operations.  Some UN peacekeepers, 
including the Turkish, Malaysian, Bangladeshi, and Maltese, are known to have 
smuggled in light arms, ammunition, and mortars.  The UN depended on American 
intelligence to monitor arm smuggling activities, but the U.S. was increasingly opposed 
to the embargo and turned a blind eye, and by some accounts even informally facilitated 
arms smuggling to the Croats and Bosniaks.  Part of the reason for this symbiotic 
relationship was that Bosnia’s highly criminalized war economy was generally not 
predatory or violent towards international actors, and therefore UN peace operations were 
often incorporated into it.  However, the end of the conflict in late 1995 significantly 
altered the situation on the ground and marked a gradual shift in the relationship between 
peace operations and organized crime as each side adapted to the new environment.108 
B. POST-CONFLICT, 1995–2003 
 Initial post-conflict conditions, such as the legacies of criminalized war 
economies and the creation of convoluted state structures by the Dayton Accords, limited 
the effectiveness of counter-crime activities.  War profiteer groups had “start-up funds” 
from their wartime activities that allowed them to continue many of their practices post-
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conflict, including questionable privatization deals and reconstruction contracts.  Post-
war Bosnia was also overflowing with weapons and organized groups quickly began 
smuggling arms into neighboring countries and even EU member nations.109  
Furthermore, corrupt, ultra-nationalist politicians who rose to power during the war 
continued to rely on these groups, who were now involved in organized crime syndicates, 
to retain their power and obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Accords.110  The 
Dayton Accords established a sophisticated ethnic power sharing model at the cost of 
effective and efficient state structures.  Policing responsibilities were not assigned to the 
state level, but to the two governing entities, the Federation and the RS.  While the RS 
had a fairly centralized system of government, the Federation’s ten cantons all had 
independent police forces, creating a decentralized system not conducive to fighting 
organized crime.111 
 The arrival of vast numbers of peace operations personnel, including IFOR’s 
60,000 soldiers, further contributed to the growth of organized crime in Bosnia by fueling 
the growth of brothels and sex trafficking.  International personnel accounted for up to 
seventy percent of trafficking profits by the late 1990s.112   The peace operations also 
helped create a more stable and secure environment for illicit business, illustrated by the 
so-called Arizona Market, which was formed near a headquarters for 4000 peace 
operations troops in the Spring of 1996.  The U.S. Army actually provided $40,000 of 
startup funds for the market to encourage entrepreneurship and cross-ethnic reconciliation 
and interaction.  Instead, the market became a center for prostitution and for smuggling 
drugs, guns, stolen cars, and other goods.113  All of these factors allowed organized crime 
elements to play an increasingly pivotal role in Bosnia’s power structure, and by the late 
1990s, forty to sixty percent of Bosnia’s economy was based on black-market  
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commerce.114  Despite these developments, counter-crime efforts were largely neglected 
in the initial post-conflict peace process, not ranking highly on the agenda of international 
state-builders.115 
 In time, the international community began to realize that organized crime posed 
a greater threat to Bosnia’s security and stability than the possibility of renewed military 
conflict, and that something had to be done before power was further consolidated 
outside the state’s authority.116  However, Dayton’s initially weak, limited mandate for 
the civilian mission meant that early on the OHR did not have the capacity to effectively 
coordinate international counter-crime efforts.  This meant that the implementation of 
counter-crime policy in the early post-conflict years was the result of bargaining between 
international and domestic actors with divergent interests and was hindered by 
international mandates and activities that were often incoherent, lacked credibility with 
the Bosnian population, and did not adequately address Bosnia’s security needs.  
Likewise, the UN’s International Police Task Force’s (IPTF) limited mandate meant that 
it did not have the resources or expertise to single-handedly confront Bosnia’s organized 
crime problem and IFOR was initially reluctant to support the IPTF or engage in law 
enforcement activities due to its emphasis on force protection and a fear of “mission 
creep.”117  After IFOR’s mandate expired in late 1996, it was replaced with SFOR, but in 
its early period of deployment it also largely failed to support IPTF’s efforts to fight 
organized crime.118 
 Despite SFOR’s initial reservations about supporting policing actions, by the late 
1990s it was becoming obvious that neither its civilian counterparts nor local law 
enforcement had the capacity to take on the threat crime groups posed to the peace 
mission and SFOR took advantage of its broad mandate to lend more support to anti-
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organized crime operations.  In 1998, NATO deployed constabulary-style Multinational 
Specialized Units (MSUs), made up primarily of Italian Carabinieri with a great deal of 
experience in dealing with organized crime.  Although law enforcement was outside the 
MSUs’ mandate, their ability to perform effective patrols, information collection, covert 
surveillance, and protective services would prove critical to SFOR’s operations against 
organized crime.119  Still, as the following examples show, NATO’s efforts would prove 
to be an uphill battle, in large part because of how entrenched these criminal activities 
had become in Bosnian society and politics and the level of support and protection this 
afforded them. 
 In January 1999, the local police of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, with significant 
support from MSUs, arrested Jozo Peric, the local organized crime boss.  Although the 
arrest temporarily disrupted criminal activities in the area, Peric was eventually released 
for lack of evidence because he had received advance warning of the arrest and was able 
to purge all incriminating documents.  In October 1999, SFOR raided the Mostar 
headquarters of the National Security Service (SNS), a covert Bosnian-Croat intelligence 
agency, and confiscated equipment for producing forged credit and bank cards, a cache of 
illegal weapons and ammunition, and evidence that the SNS was carrying out intelligence 
operations to disrupt the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia and implementation of the Dayton Accords.  It was subsequently discovered 
that the SNS was carrying out financial crimes to fund these activities.120 
 In the spring of 2001 OHR and SFOR pressure on organized crime and nationalist 
politicians in Croatian areas of Bosnia resulted in political revolt and violence against the 
international community.  The ultra-nationalist Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica 
(Croatian Democratic Union) party, or HDZ, declared they were withdrawing from the 
Federation and establishing Croat self-government in part of Herzegovina.  To undermine 
the HDZ, SFOR attempted to seize and audit the accounts of Herzegovacka Bank, which 
was primarily controlled by senior members of HDZ with close ties to organized crime.  
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The bank was a front for laundering profits from illegal trade in oil, cigarettes, liquor, and 
stolen vehicles, which the HDZ then used to promote their cause by paying off local 
police, politicians, and media.  However SFOR’s operations had been compromised, and 
audit teams and their MSU guards entering the bank’s headquarters and branches were 
intimidated and attacked by armed mobs.  Twenty-nine foreigners and Bosnians were 
injured, several seriously, and by the time heavily armed SFOR troops returned to the 
headquarters, all incriminating files and computer records had disappeared.121 
 The mixed results of these operations showed that it would take a more effective, 
unified strategy and better coordination between international military and civilian 
agencies and local law enforcement to successfully challenge local and regional 
organized crime groups, which were better integrated and more willing to set aside ethnic 
and ideological divides in pursuit of their goals.122  The overlapping jurisdictions of local 
and international administrations caused a constant shifting of responsibility between 
national and international judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and the numerous 
Bosnian police forces mistrusted each other and had no formally established methods of 
cooperation.  These factors impeded the multi-disciplinary response and cooperation 
between institutions at the local, national and international levels required to curb 
organized crime.  These flaws were underscored by a 2003 European Commission 
progress report stating that civil-military cooperation in the fight against organized crime 
in Bosnia was a major problem, allowing criminal activities such as customs fraud and 
smuggling to rob Bosnia’s legitimate economy of approximately 150 to 300 million Euro 
per year, roughly equivalent to the annual state budget.  However, with the EU about to 
take control of both the military and police components of the peace operation, there was 
hope that unified command would help correct these shortfalls and turn the tide against 
organized crime in Bosnia.123 
                                                 
121 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When we Need Him? 173–174. 
122 Muehlmann, “EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime,” 388. 
123 Muehlmann, “EU Civil-Military Cooperation and the Fight against Organized Crime,” 390–391. 
 45
C. EUPM/EUFOR AND BEYOND, 2003–PRESENT 
 In 2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) took over from the UN’s IPTF and has 
since played a critical role in helping establish and support Bosnian law enforcement 
agencies.124  In late 2004, EU Force Althea (EUFOR) took over from SFOR, and like 
SFOR, it has a broad mandate to support civilian peace operations, which it has used 
more forcefully to confront elements of organized crime.  The fact that the EU now 
controls both the military and civilian international peacebuilding and reconstruction 
effort in Bosnia has made civil-military coordination in the effort to fight organized 
crime, after some initial growing pains, easier and more effective.125  This intra-
organizational environment has allowed EUFOR and EUPM to capitalize on each other’s 
strengths and establish a unified front against organized crime.  For example, MSUs, 
renamed Integrated Police Units, had their capabilities fully integrated with EUPM 
counter-crime efforts.126  This effective transition also encouraged Bosnian law 
enforcement authorities to step up their efforts against organized crime, including 
enhancing the police’s crime-fighting capabilities and better facilitating cooperation 
among the various crime-fighting actors, from the police to prosecutors to tax 
authorities.127 
 EUFOR and the EUPM were able to pick up where SFOR and the IPTF left off, 
capitalize on their achievements, and take counter-crime efforts to the next level.  
Increased emphasis on confronting Bosnia’s sex trafficking problem and a significant 
reduction in the number of international personnel involved with this activity 
considerably reduced human trafficking by 2005.   NATO raids, the lifting of sanctions, 
and more effective border controls had already reduced arms smuggling, but the EU’s 
better-coordinated operations were able to more effectively strangle this criminal 
industry, and by 2007/2008 arms smuggling in Bosnia was virtually eliminated.  EUFOR 
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aerial surveillance of marijuana cultivation has also cut into Bosnia’s drug trade.128  
These counter-crime efforts, as well as relative improvements in state-level institutions 
and economic and physical security, have significantly reduced the level of violent 
organized crime in Bosnia, actually making it less prevalent than in many Western 
European countries.129  However, there is some indication that these measures have not 
dramatically reduced the presence of organized crime, but simply shifted it to other 
industries such as white-collar illicit business and vehicle theft and trafficking.130 
 During the 1990s, activities associated with high levels of violence, such as the 
trafficking of people or weapons, were widespread in Bosnia.  However, according to a 
2008 report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “the Balkans are departing from an 
era when demagogues, secret police and thugs profited from sanctions busting and the 
smuggling of people, arms, cigarettes and drugs,” with a swing from black economic 
activities to shadow and “white” entrepreneurship.131  Addressing these types of crimes 
will require a shift away from EUFOR/EUPM-style military-backed, forceful policing to 
more investigative, legalistic police work with local law enforcement taking the lead.  
However, coordination between EUPM and Bosnian police has been difficult, and local 
forces do not appear ready to take over the reins, partly because they answer to EUPM 
instead of to local elected officials.132  In fact, the 2009 EU progress report on Bosnia 
negatively assessed the implementation of its 2006-2009 strategy to combat organized 
crime, stating that institutional fragmentation of the Bosnian police and the lack of a 
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inadequate exchanges of operational data and implementation of joint action.  More 
determination is needed and sustained efforts to harmonize legislation and increase 
cooperation throughout the country is necessary.133 
D. EVALUATION 
 This case study has shown that organized crime can be a powerful impediment to 
establishing the sustainable economy and rule of law critical to attaining stabilization and 
reconstruction objectives.  Therefore, it is important to evaluate how effective the peace 
operation’s counter-crime efforts in Bosnia have been at promoting these two end states 
using the the conditions set forth in Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction.  The conditions for attaining a sustainable economy include 
macroeconomic stabilization, market economy sustainability, employment generation, 
and control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace.  The conditions 
for establishing the rule of law are accountability to the law, a culture of lawfulness, a 
just legal framework, access to justice, and public order.134 
 The peace operation’s confrontation with organized crime has had an impact on 
all four conditions necessary for Bosnia to attain a sustainable economy.  From a 
macroeconomic stabilization standpoint, the presence of a large stabilization and 
reconstruction mission was beneficial in that it helped create a more stable and secure 
environment for economic development.  Although the initial lack of focus on combating 
organized crime allowed criminal elements to take advantage of this stability to expand 
their operations and undermine macroeconomic development, over time strengthened law 
enforcement efforts weakened organized crime’s influence on Bosnia’s economy.  The 
development of a sustainable market economy was also initially undermined by the post-
conflict expansion of illicit business, but more effective counter-crime efforts, especially 
under EUFOR, have helped gradually shift the economy from black to gray and 
potentially legal markets.  Likewise, the initial growth of organized crime correlated to 
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employment generation in illegal activities such as smuggling and prostitution, partly to 
meet the demands of the large peacekeeping contingent.  However, as law enforcement 
intensified and the size of the peacekeeping force was reduced, this workforce 
transitioned to more legitimate forms of employment. 
 The conflict between peace operations and organized crime had its primary 
economic impact on the control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to 
peace.  The relations forged during the war between criminal groups and Bosnian 
government officials, especially ultra-nationalists, corrupt politicians and the secret 
police, were a major impediment to gaining legitimate control over the illicit economy 
and economic threats to peace.  Furthermore, the initial lack of effort to confront criminal 
activity meant that war profiteers were free to use their earnings to strengthen their illegal 
criminal networks and pay off local police, politicians, and media to undermine any 
attempts to counter crime and promote sustainable peace.  However, the peacekeepers 
gradually began to turn the tide due to stronger counter-crime measures and the 
introduction of MSUs in 1999, and by 2008 EUFOR believed it had criminal economic 
activity largely under control.  Still, there are recent indications that efforts to eliminate 
the post-conflict illicit economy have simply forced criminal networks to transition to 
white collar crime, which although less violent, could still pose a serious threat to 
Bosnia’s economic recovery. 
 The peace operation’s approach to dealing with organized crime also impacted 
efforts to promote the rule of law in Bosnia.  The mission’s initial lack of focus on law 
enforcement meant that criminal networks and corrupt officials with criminal ties could 
continue their illicit activities with no accountability to the law.  These networks became 
so entrenched in Bosnian society and politics that OHR and SFOR attempts to rein in 
organized crime in 2001 met with political revolt and violence targeting representatives 
of the international community.  Attempts to promote a culture of lawfulness were also 
undermined by the pervasiveness of this criminal culture, as well as by the peacekeepers 




not significantly promoted because counter-crime activities were rarely able to generate 
prosecutable evidence, and the corruption of the local judicial system would have 
undermined attempts to carry out fair legal proceedings. 
 Public order, especially its law enforcement component, is the rule of law 
condition most influenced by the peace operation’s efforts to confront Bosnia’s organized 
crime problem.  From the outset the fragmented, centrally weak government structure 
established by the Dayton Accords undermined law enforcement and crime fighting 
efforts by leading to overlapping legal jurisdiction and a lack of cooperation between law 
enforcement agencies.  Furthermore, the OHR’s initially weak mandate prevented it from 
effectively coordinating law enforcement operations between international and local 
police forces.  The IPTF’s limited mandate and IFOR’s hesitancy to support law 
enforcement missions further hindered the fight against organized crime.  However, the 
late 1990s saw a positive turning point in the promotion of public order with the 
introduction of MSUs and increased support from SFOR.  The transition to EUFOR and 
EUPM further enhanced law enforcement capabilities by improving civilian-military 
cooperation, thereby reducing violent crime to levels below those in many Western 
European countries.  Even so, efforts to improve coordination with state authorities and 
transition responsibility to local police forces have proven challenging, primarily due to a 
weak central government and inadequate law enforcement institutions.  This continues to 
undermine counter-crime efforts and the sustainability of public order and the rule of law. 
 Based on this analysis, the peace operations’ counter-crime efforts have had a 
varied impact on Bosnia’s economy and rule of law.  The initial lack of focus on 
combating organized crime allowed illicit businesses to expand their operations and 
challenge efforts to legalize Bosnia’s economy.  However, as crime-fighting capabilities 
improved the peace mission helped facilitate the transition to a legal, sustainable 
economy.  The peace operation’s slow start in confronting organized crime also 
reinforced a post-conflict culture of lawlessness and public disorder that undermined 
efforts to improve the rule of law.  This issue was eventually addressed once law 
enforcement capabilities were bolstered.  However, counter-crime efforts continue to face 
significant challenges stemming from the entrenchment of criminal networks during the 
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war.  Based on this conclusion, addressing the issues that undermine a state’s rule of law 
and sustainable economy during peace may be the best way to prevent organized crime 
from establishing a foothold that it can then exploit during war.  Conversely, a preventive 
approach can help prevent the outbreak of violent conflict altogether, as the next chapter 
on the UN’s preventive deployment to Macedonia demonstrates. 
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V. UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT TO 
MACEDONIA 
 Although much of the literature on peace operations states that preventing violent 
conflict is easier and less costly than attempting to resolve and recover from conflict once 
it has begun, minimal attention is paid to evaluating examples of preventive operations.  
This chapter studies the first, and so far only, example of a UN preventive deployment, 
UNPROFOR Macedonia, redesignated UNPREDEP in 1995.  The purpose of this case 
study is to determine whether UNPREDEP was successful at preventing violence from 
spreading into Macedonia and whether such deployments are in fact a less expensive and 
more effective alternative to peace operations carried out after violence has erupted.  The 
effectiveness of this operation will be further evaluated by analyzing its ability to 
promote the end states of a safe and secure environment and stable governance as defined 
in Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction,135 which are critical to the 
long-term success of a preventive deployment in establishing sustainable stability and 
security. 
A. BACKGROUND 
 Like its neighbors to the north, Macedonia was caught up in the wave of post-
Cold War secession in Yugoslavia and in September 1991, Skopje declared its 
independence from Belgrade.  But why would Macedonia, the weakest of the Yugoslav 
republics, declare independence and risk invoking a war with Serbia that it could not 
hope to win?  Serbian President Milosevic had encouraged Macedonia to not seek 
independence and the Serbian government even issued a formal appeal to Skopje to not 
secede, a position also favored by Greece, a regional power in the southern Balkans.  
However, Macedonia realized that it did not want to remain a part of a Serb-dominated 
Yugoslavia without a Croatian or Slovenian counterbalance and went ahead with 
secession after a referendum for independence was passed on September 8, 1991.  For 
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territorial and/or ethnic reasons its neighbors were less than enthusiastic about Skopje’s 
declaration, especially Greece and Serbia, who reacted with open hostility.  The resulting 
lack of international recognition, economic embargoes, and isolation complicated 
Macedonia’s transition to an independent state, destabilizing an already vulnerable nation 
and promoting internal ethnic tensions.136 
 Adding to Macedonia’s problems was the fact that all the other newly 
independent former-Yugoslav states had engaged in some form of violent conflict.  With 
Croatia and Bosnia embroiled in major wars, there was a widespread belief that it was 
just a matter of time before war spread to Macedonia.  Like Croatia, Macedonia had a 
large minority group (Albanian) primarily concentrated in one geographic region and 
extremist Albanians had even proclaimed their own independent “republic.”137  
Furthermore, the southeastern Balkans, including Macedonia, had the least developed 
economies in the former Yugoslavia because they were at a greater distance from the 
industrial centers in Central and Western Europe.  The Albanian communities in Kosovo 
and Macedonia were the poorest of all, and not surprisingly, showed the highest level of 
intolerance and ethnic tension.138 
 A conflict over Macedonia could have expanded from a regional to an 
international war involving not only the former Yugoslavia, but also all of Macedonia’s 
neighbors, and the involvement of Greece could have drawn in Turkey.  A conflict 
involving Greece and Turkey, whose relations had been steadily worsening since the 
division of Cyprus in 1974, was a serious concern for the international community.  
Greece has had a longstanding political dispute with Macedonia and strong political and 
cultural links with Serbia (Milosevic’s family owned property in the Greek Islands).  
Turkey naturally felt more sympathetic towards the Muslim population in the Balkans, 
including the Albanian minority in Macedonia, which they believed was being persecuted 
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by Orthodox Christians.  These fundamental differences in interpreting the situation in 
the Balkans could have sparked the first war between NATO allies, a development that 
could have jeopardized the future of the alliance and sparked a global crisis.139 
 However, Milosevic did not actively oppose Skopje’s declaration of independence 
because he was not overly concerned about Macedonia’s small Serbian minority of about 
40,000, despite the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church classified Macedonians as 
“South Serbs.”  Greece’s objection was primarily over the use of the name Macedonia, 
which it interpreted as a potential claim to its northern Macedonian region, formerly the 
southern portion of a greater Macedonia.  However, this was not reason enough to begin 
a military conflict, especially since, considering the circumstances in the region, it was in 
Athens’ best interests to have a stable neighbor on its northern border.  Albania 
ultimately welcomed Macedonia’s independence because it saw it “as a counterweight to 
Serbia and an irritant to Greece,” and Bulgaria did not want to jeopardize its fragile 
stability and efforts to join European institutions.140 
 Nevertheless, the Balkans were a volatile region and a peaceful secession did not 
guarantee the young nation a secure future.  Macedonia still had to deal with less than 
friendly more powerful neighbors, no real military capability, an unstable economy, tense 
ethnic relations, and a political system in transition.  The Yugoslav military had pulled 
out of Macedonia and transferred its soldiers and equipment to the Bosnian front, but that 
conflict would eventually draw down, allowing Serbia to direct its focus towards its 
southern neighbor.141  More importantly, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians 
were on the rise across the northern border in Kosovo, drawing the attention of Albania to 
the West and Macedonia’s own Albanian minority.  Realizing his nation’s tenuous 
position, on November 11, 1992, President Gligorov of Macedonia conveyed a request to  
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UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali for the deployment of UN observers to the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in view of his concern regarding the possible spread of 
violence from elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.142 
B. INTERVENTION 
 With the Security Council’s approval, in late November 1992, the Secretary-
General sent a team of military, police and civilian personnel to Macedonia to assess the 
situation on the ground and prepare a report concerning a possible deployment of 
UNPROFOR to that Republic.  In early December, the Secretary-General submitted 
report S/24923 to the Security Council, in which he recommended an expansion of the 
mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a UN presence on Macedonia’s borders 
with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He 
indicated that the force’s mandate would fall largely under Chapter VI of the Charter of 
the UN and be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the 
border areas that could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its 
territory.  The Secretary-General recommended that this mission be comprised of a 
battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 UN Military Observers (UNMOs), 26 UN Civilian 
Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, and 45 administrative staff and local 
interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR’s “Macedonia 
Command” with its headquarters located in Skopje.143 
 On December 11, 1992. the Security Council passed Resolution 795 with a 15-0 
vote, unanimously approving the Secretary-General’s report and authorizing the 
establishment of UNPROFOR’s presence in Macedonia.  The mission was charged, by its 
presence, to deter “threats from any source, as well as help prevent clashes that could 
otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to 
strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia.”  The military deployment’s objectives 
would be to: “Monitor Macedonia’s borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of 
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Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), report all activities that might increase tension or 
threaten peace and stability, (and) stand between forces that might otherwise clash.”  It 
was pointed out that Macedonian authorities did not expect the UN to defend its borders.  
UNCIVPOL’s mandate would be to “monitor the work of the local border police.  On the 
western border the UNCIVPOL presence would assist in calming any inter-ethnic 
tensions, mainly in the context of illegal border crossings.”  Civil Affairs Officers would 
liaison between UNPROFOR and the central and local authorities, and Public 
Information Officers were charged with implementing an information program to ensure 
“the role of the United Nations presence is fully understood by the population.”144 
 The Security Council requested that the force be deployed immediately and urged 
UNPROFOR Macedonia to coordinate closely with the Organization for Security 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission, which already had a spillover monitoring 
mission in place in Skopje since September 1992.  Due to the violence spreading 
throughout the Balkans at the time, the UN was perceived by many as being incapable of 
effectively intervening in ethnic conflicts and this was an opportunity for the Security 
Council to prove that it could successfully coordinate and execute a preventive, multi-
dimensional peacekeeping mission.145  Secretary General Boutros-Ghali told the Security 
Council that he envisioned a UN mission to Macedonia “as being a preventive 
deployment of the kind discussed in . . . An Agenda for Peace,”146 an opportunity to test 
his revolutionary concept of preventive deployment as a new method of conflict 
prevention.  The speed with which the force deployed highlighted the importance the UN 
placed on this mission: two civil affairs officers were on the ground in Macedonia within 
24 hours of the passing of Resolution 795.  A senior UNMO arrived on December 17, 
followed by UNCIVPOL officers on 28 December.  By January 26, 1993, 500 Canadians  
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were in country, replaced in February by a Nordic Battalion of 700 Scandinavian 
soldiers, which was supplemented that July by a U.S. battalion of 300 American soldiers, 
the first use of U.S. combat forces under UN command.147 
C. CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PEACE 
OPERATION 
 UNPROFOR Macedonia quickly established a presence on the ground in 
Macedonia, and immediately began building an organizational structure and 
infrastructure capable of carrying out its stated mandated.  It set up fixed and temporary 
observation posts along Macedonia’s border with Albania and Serbia, and carried out its 
mission through ground and air patrols.  UNMOs and UNCIVPOL primarily deployed 
along the Albanian border, patrolling border crossings and villages.  Immediately 
establishing good relations with the local population proved essential to carrying out the 
observer mission, including UNCIVPOL’s contacts with the local Macedonian police and 
their monitoring of the treatment of individuals in custody.  Since Serbia and Macedonia 
were still negotiating a border dispute, one of the primary missions of the peacekeeping 
troops was monitoring the UN-established administrative line (interim border).  Since the 
border was not clearly marked, peacekeepers mostly dealt with minor, accidental 
incursion, which were usually resolved by simply informing the perpetrators that they 
were on the wrong side of the border.  The peacekeepers generally dealt with more crime-
related activities along the Albanian border, such as cross-border smuggling and illegal 
border crossings.148 
 However, it soon became clear that the threat to Macedonia’s security and 
stability came less from external aggression than internal issues, such as an ineffective 
government, rampant corruption, a weak economy, and interethnic conflict.  The mission 
realized that in order to carry out its broader objectives it would need to address these 
issues, but its initial mandate did not provide it the authority to do so.  The Special 
Representative of the SRSG brought this to the attention of the Secretary-General, and in 
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March 1994 Security Council Resolution 908 was passed, encouraging “the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, in cooperation with 
the authorities of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as 
appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic.”149  
Authorizing the SRSG to use his good offices significantly expanded his capabilities, 
allowing him to monitor political, economic, and social conditions and engage 
Macedonian leaders in times of crisis, often in coordination with the local OSCE mission.  
For example, in October 1994, the SRSG monitored the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in coordination with the OSCE, EU, Council of Europe and several NGOs.  One 
of his major accomplishments was convincing the competing parties to avoid ethnic 
tensions by promising to abide by democratic norms and avoid harsh nationalist 
language.150 
 In 1995, Croatia and Macedonia approached the Secretary-General with the 
request that the UN forces in their countries be separated from UNPROFOR, which they 
believed was fully engaged in a mission in Bosnia that no longer resembled their unique 
situations.  The Secretary-General subsequently presented report S/1995/222 to the 
Security Council, proposing to replace UNPROFOR with three separate but interlinked 
peacekeeping operations, each with its own military commander and headed by a civilian 
Chief of Mission.  In view of the “interlinked nature of the problems in the areas,” overall 
command and control would be exercised by the SRSG and a Theatre Force Commander 
headquartered at the UN Peace Forces headquarters (UNPF-HQ) in Zagreb.  He 
recommended converting UNPROFOR in Macedonia into UNPF-3 “with the same 
responsibilities and composition,” and the transfer of “all relevant Security Council 
resolutions and authorities.”151  On 31 March 1995, the Security Council passed 
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Resolution 983, which declared that UNPROFOR Macedonia would henceforth be 
known as UNPREDEP, with the mandate set out in the Secretary-General’s report 
mentioned above.  On February 1, 1996, with the termination of UNPF-HQ’s mandate, 
UNPREDEP became an independent mission reporting directly to UN headquarters in 
New York, further acknowledging the unique nature of UNPREDEP’s preventive 
operation.152 
 As the threat to Macedonia’s territorial integrity further decreased, UNPREDEP 
found itself playing even more of a political role focused on addressing potentially 
destabilizing internal issues.  Macedonia’s economy, never a model for success, had been 
further weakened by political and ethnic tensions, a Greek embargo, and international 
sanctions against Yugoslavia.  UNPREDEP was not as successful at improving this 
situation as Macedonia’s border issues, partly because of constraints in the mission’s 
mandate, but primarily because there was limited international support for implementing 
a robust program of economic stability and reform.  UNPREDEP also attempted to help 
address Macedonia’s social issues by carrying out developmental projects, often in 
conjunction with other UN agencies, such as teaching a UNICEF-funded landmine 
detection class for Bosnian refugees and using helicopters to deliver water pipes to 
remote villages.153 
 By mid-1997, UNPREDEP was preparing for a force reduction and an 
approaching end to its mandate.  Although instability in Albania prolonged the mandate 
until November 1997 and then August 1998, during this time the mission’s manpower 
was reduced by 300 peacekeepers.  However, due to the violence in Kosovo, the mandate 
was again extended to February 1999, and troop levels were increased to 1,050.  In mid-
February, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on UNPREDEP’s 
activities and developments in the mission area, stating that peace and stability in 
Macedonia continued to depend largely on developments in other parts of the region, in 
particular in Kosovo, and recommended extending the mandate an additional six months.  
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The force’s extension was likewise requested by the Macedonian government in a letter 
addressed to the Secretary-General, based on concern over the danger of a spill-over of 
the Kosovo conflict, increased tensions on the Albanian-Yugoslav border, and the lack of 
progress in the demarcation of the country’s border with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.  Another issue was strained relations between Macedonia and Serbia caused 
by Skopje’s decision to authorize the deployment of a NATO Extraction Force on its 
territory.154 
 However, following Skopje’s formal recognition of Taiwan, Beijing vetoed an 
extension of UNPREDEP’s mission and its mandate and mission expired on March 1, 
1999.  UNPREDEP has just reached its peak operations tempo, averaging some 400 
patrols per week from 80 observation posts, including 300 border and community patrols 
and 15 helicopter patrol missions.  In addition, the civilian police monitors were 
conducting approximately 100 patrols per week.  Furthermore, it had been less than a 
year since Security Council Resolution 1186 had expanded its mandate to monitor and 
report on illicit arms flows and other prohibited activities.  In addition, UNPREDEP’s 
contingency plans for refugees had been enacted for the first time shortly before its 
abrupt termination, when, in a prelude of what would shortly come, approximately 400 
Kosovars entered Macedonia near a UNPREDEP observation post and requested 
humanitarian assistance.155 
D. IMPACT OF THE MISSION 
 UNPREDEP demonstrated that a flexible, multi-dimensional approach to 
preventive deployment can be effective and is an example of conflict prevention where 
actions by both internal and external actors worked together to prevent a potential clash 
and in effect establish an international guarantee on a nation’s territorial integrity.  The 
force’s mandate was expanded several times to meet the mission’s evolving requirements 
and the mix of military deployments, good offices, and humanitarian development proved 
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to be operationally effective.156  The high level of capability and professionalism of the 
Scandinavian and American soldiers also contributed to the force’s effectiveness.157  As 
the Secretary-General stated in a report on UNPREDEP to the Security Council: 
“UNPREDEP has demonstrated that preventive deployment can work where there is 
political will, a clear mandate and purpose, and the necessary commitment on the part of 
all parties concerned.”158  These factors allowed UNPREDEP to effectively carry out is 
primary mission to prevent violent conflict and deter, by its presence, any threats to 
Macedonia’s peace and stability, thereby ensuring Macedonia was the only former 
Yugoslav republic to secede peacefully. 
 In addition, UNPREDEP effectively coordinated and integrated the functions of 
numerous regional and international players into a cohesive peace operation, including 
the OSCE, Council of Europe, EU, NATO, several UN organizations, and NGOs.  This 
illustrates that, provided the appropriate mandate, a UN force can step up and 
convincingly lead a multifaceted regional peacekeeping mission.  Furthermore, 
UNPREDEP showed that timely preventive action can be a far less costly approach to 
international intervention.  The UN mission in Macedonia lasted approximately six years 
with an average annual budget of $55 million, bringing the total cost to $330 million.  In 
contrast, an intermediate-level, two-year conflict has been estimated to cost on average 
$15 billion, while a large regional conflict involving several countries can cost as much 
as $144 billion.  These figures do not account for the massive human costs of war, which 
UNPREDEP’s efforts also helped prevent.159 
 UNPREDEP’s stabilizing influence also gave Macedonia an opportunity to 
address issues critical to its long-term stability, including building better relations with 
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neighboring countries and stronger ties to the international community.160  In 1993, the 
naming dispute with Greece was temporarily resolved when Macedonia agreed to use the 
provisional name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.  That same year, 
Macedonia was admitted to the UN under its provisional name and, within a few years, 
Greece would become Macedonia’s biggest investor.  This opened the door for 
Macedonian membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the nation receiving the democratic certificate of 
membership in the Council of Europe.  Skopje began receiving financial assistance from 
the EU in 1992.  That amount increased substantially starting in 1996, with the 
implementation of the EU’s Phare program for the development of democracy and a free-
market system.  The young state also attained the formal recognition of all its neighbors 
with the signing of an interim accord with Greece in September 1995, and establishment 
of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia in early 1996.161 
 UNPREDEP’s attempts to address Macedonia’s social and economic issues had 
more limited results, partly because the force was never formally mandated to perform 
this mission or manned or resourced for such efforts.  Although the mission’s modest 
successes in these areas did help promote security and stability, it could have made better 
progress if the international community had more effectively supplemented the 
preventive deployment with economic assistance.162  Furthermore, per Henryk Sokalski, 
the civilian head of UNPREDEP from 1995 to 1998, his mission should have been better 
funded to perform confidence-building humanitarian and developmental projects.  Force 
commanders often could not help villages that had requested assistance with building 
roads for basic transportation, pipelines for running water, wiring for electricity, or spare 
parts for pumps and generators.163  These projects could have generated significant 
goodwill and trust from the local population, more than making up for their modest costs. 
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 Ultimately though, the mission’s potential impact was cut short by China’s 
February 1999 veto of the Security Council resolution to extend UNPREDEP’s mandate.  
Beijing’s position was that it had always maintained that UN peacekeeping operations, 
including preventive deployment missions, should not be open-ended.  Since the situation 
in Macedonia had stabilized and its relations with neighboring countries had improved, a 
UN peacekeeping force was no longer required.  Others believe Beijing’s true motive was 
retribution for Macedonia’s recent diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.164  Whatever the 
reason, the sudden termination of UNPREDEP’s mission prematurely halted its 
productive work, stalling Macedonia’s development and leaving it vulnerable to rising 
ethnic tensions, both internally and along its northern border. 
 Macedonia would face several significant threats to its security and stability 
shortly after the departure of UNPREDEP.  Throughout the late 1990s, ethnic tension and 
violence had been escalating between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs, leading to military 
involvement from Serbia and subsequently a NATO air campaign from March to June 
1999, against Serbia and Serb military targets in Kosovo.  These developments added to 
the ethnic divide within Macedonia, with Albanians supporting their Kosovar 
counterparts and NATO’s military action and Macedonians generally supporting the 
Serbs and opposing NATO’s campaign.  They also caused the sudden influx of 350,000 
Kosovar Albanian refugees, equal to nearly one fifth of Macedonia’s population, further 
straining the nation’s fragile stability.  Another significant test was a 2001 insurgency by 
the extremist nationalist Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA), which threatened to 
escalate to a major violent conflict.  However, once more Macedonia averted war through 
political cooperation and international support, with Macedonian and Albanian parties 
signing the Ohrid Agreement in August 2001, giving more rights to the minority 
Albanians through constitutional amendments, providing more power to local  
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governments, and allowing the use of the Albanian language in state institutions.165  
Another test came in February 2004, when Macedonian President Trajkovski was killed 
in a plane crash and riots broke out across the border in Kosovo two weeks later, but yet 
again stability held.166 
E. EVALUATION 
 This section further evaluates UNPREDEP’s performance through its ability to 
advance the conditions necessary to attaining the end states of establishing a safe and 
secure environment and stable governance as described in Guiding Principles for 
Stabilization and Reconstruction,167 since these end states are critical to promoting the 
stability and security of a nation vulnerable to violent conflict.  The conditions for 
achieving a safe and secure environment include territorial security, physical security, 
public order, the cessation of large-scale violence, and a legitimate state monopoly over 
the means of violence.  The conditions necessary for establishing stable governance are 
the provision of essential services, political moderation and accountability, stewardship 
of state resources, and civic participation and empowerment.  
 Ensuring Macedonia’s territorial security was UNPREDEP’s primary mission 
under its mandate and it fulfilled this objective by in effect establishing an international 
guarantee on Macedonia’s territorial integrity.  The operation’s regular patrols along the 
borders with Albania and Serbia ensured incursions were resolved peacefully and did not 
escalate, particularly along the UN Administrative Line with Serbia.  This mission was 
especially important during the instability in Albania and Kosovo in the late 1990s, which 
could have easily spilled over into Macedonia.  However, UNPREDEP’s efforts to help 
resolve the Macedonian-Serbian border dispute were not effective, and this issue flared 
up when NATO stationed an extraction force on Macedonian territory during its Kosovo  
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campaign.  From a physical security standpoint, the mission helped protect the first group 
of Kosovar refugees that crossed into Macedonia in 1999 seeking humanitarian 
assistance. 
 UNPREDEP and UNCIVPOL promoted public order from a law enforcement 
standpoint by working with the local Macedonian police to prevent criminal activities 
along the border with Albania and monitoring their treatment of individuals in custody.  
UNPREDEP was becoming more involved in law enforcement after its mission was 
expanded to include monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other crimes, but 
the sudden termination of its mandate prevented further progress.  Although UNPREDEP 
did not have to deal with large-scale violence, the stabilizing impact of its presence and 
operations may have prevented the outbreak of violence along Macedonia’s borders.  
Furthermore, the swift political resolution of the 2001 NLA insurgency may not have 
been possible without UNPREDEP’s preceding stabilization and reform efforts.  This 
incident also indicated that the mission’s support of the Macedonian government had 
facilitated state efforts to gain a fairly strong monopoly over means of organized 
violence. 
 UNPREDEP was able to effectively promote stable governance in Macedonia 
once its mandate was expanded in 1994 to allow the SRSG to use his “good offices” to 
maintain peace and stability and strengthen the government.  The operation supported the 
provision of essential services through its modest developmental projects, although it 
could have accomplished more if it were better funded in this area.  The SRSG’s 
monitoring of the 1994 elections furthered political moderation and accountability by 
promoting democratic norms and reducing the level of antagonistic nationalist language.  
UNPREDEP’s security assistance allowed the Macedonian government to focus its 
limited state resources towards developing civil society and reforming the security sector.  
These reforms subsequently promoted Macedonia’s civic participation and empowerment 
by facilitating a peace agreement to the 2001 NLA insurgency that gave ethnic Albanians 
more political rights and distributed more power to local governments. 
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 This evaluation demonstrate that a timely, well organized preventive deployment 
with an appropriate mandate and support from the international community and host-
nation can be largely effective at helping establishing a safe and secure environment and 
stable governance.  Although UNPREDEP’s mission was cut short by the premature 
termination of its mandate, its peace operations and developmental efforts had a positive 
long-term impact on Macedonia’s ability to effectively govern itself, promote internal 
stability, and secure its borders. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis researched three elements of peace operations in the former 
Yugoslavia, which, although generally considered important to their success, have not 
received sufficient attention in current literature on peace missions in the Balkans.  These 
elements include the Dayton Accords’ impact on promoting Bosnia’s social well-being, 
the ability of peace operations to deal with organized crime in Bosnia, and the long-term 
effectiveness of the UNPREDEP mission to Macedonia.  These factors were evaluated 
using the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction168 and a broader 
analysis based on an operation’s ability to accomplish its assigned mission and promote 
the development of its host nation.  This concluding section reviews and compares the 
findings of this study to better understand the long-term impact of these missions, 
identify any recurring themes and lessons, and determine if any of them have been 
applied in doctrine or practice. 
 The social well-being case study concludes that the Dayton Accords and 
associated peace operations were successful at quickly reestablishing basic services post-
conflict and promoting freedom of movement for the return of displaced persons.  
However, these efforts have been hampered in the long-run by the weak central 
government and largely independent entities established by the Accords, leading to 
fragmented state institutions.  This means that the state has not been able to enforce 
measures intended to promote the nation’s social well-being and implement social 
reforms necessary for full integration into the European and international communities.  
Most children do not have access to standardized, quality, ethnically diverse education 
and the situation is getting worse.  The division of institutions and services between 
entities undermines the return of displaced persons, as does violence and discrimination 
faced by ethnic minorities.  Furthermore, minorities, the disabled, and the displaced all  
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have difficulties accessing adequate basic needs and services.  Although the Bosnian 
government should be resolving these issues, it is too divided and dependent on the 
international community to make any headway. 
 These issues indicate that Bosnia is not yet ready to take responsibility for its 
social well-being.  The lack of progress in establishing a strong central government and 
state institutions continues to undermine efforts to improve social dialogue and relations 
between ethnic groups, encouraging further segregation, the rise of nationalist ethnic 
parties, and political undermining of war crimes prosecution.  It also undercuts efforts to 
address these issues by thwarting the adoption of legislation to further Bosnia’s social-
well being.  This include laws to ensure minority rights and representation at all levels of 
government and provide universal, ethnically sensitive education.  Fifteen years on, the 
flaws of the Dayton Accords continue to undermine Bosnia’s social well-being and 
prevent a final resolution to the conflict that devastated the nation with war.  They also 
prevent it from reducing its dependence on the international community and making 
progress towards becoming a truly stable, sovereign state.  Ultimately, there can be no 
sustainable peace until the conditions for ensuring a population’s social well-being are 
met, but as of today, Bosnia is not capable of making the progress necessary to achieve 
that goal in the foreseeable future. 
 The organized crime case study demonstrates that peace operations and criminal 
networks tend to have a complicated relationship: tolerating, cooperating with, or 
attempting to impede each other’s operations based on what position best promotes their 
interests and objectives.  During wartime, peace operations are focused on protecting and 
supporting the civilian population and containing and stopping the conflict, all while 
operating in an inhospitable environment.  Their focus is not on combating organized 
crime and, as the Bihac example illustrates, they may tolerate or even cooperate with 
illicit activities that support attaining their objectives.  However, such alliances of 
opportunity generally begin to break down post-conflict, when peace operations turn their 
focus toward stabilization and reconstruction. 
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 Efforts to confront organized crime in post-conflict Bosnia started slow, but 
improved as the mission progressed.  The peace operation’s early lack of focus on law 
enforcement, the initial weakness of the OHR, and IFOR’s unwillingness to engage in 
nontraditional operations allowed criminal networks to flourish nearly unimpeded.  Over 
time an empowered High Representative, better civilian-military cooperation, and the 
introduction of military constabulary forces began to subdue violent crime.  However, as 
in the case of promoting social well-being, a long term, sustainable solution to the 
problem is undermined by a weak state government with inadequate institutions unable to 
take responsibility for policing its territory. 
 The impact of the peace operations’ counter-crime efforts on promoting Bosnia’s 
economy and rule of law have been mixed.  From an economic standpoint, the initial lack 
of focus on combating organized crime gave illicit businesses the opportunity to expand 
their operations and undermine efforts to legalize Bosnia’s economy.  However, as efforts 
to fight organized crime improved the peace operation facilitated the ongoing transition 
to a legal, sustainable economy.  Similarly, the peace operation’s slow start in 
confronting organized crime hurt efforts to improve the rule of law by allowing a post-
conflict culture of lawlessness and public disorder and only turned this around once its 
law enforcement capabilities were bolstered.  Although counter-crime efforts were 
eventually able to promote Bosnia’s economy and rule of law, they still face significant 
challenges, in large part due to the entrenchment of criminal networks during the war.  
From this standpoint the best strategy may be a preventive one.  Addressing the issues 
that undermine a state’s rule of law and sustainable economy during peace can help 
prevent organized crime from establishing a foothold that it can then exploit during war.  
As the UN’s preventive deployment to Macedonia demonstrates, a preventive approach 
can help prevent the outbreak of violent conflict altogether. 
 In the case of UNPREDEP, although there was significant ethnic tension between 
the Slavic Macedonian majority and Albanian minority, they were not enflamed by the 
atrocities of war.  Furthermore, although Macedonia’s state institutions required 
strengthening and post-communist reforms, they did not have to be rebuilt from scratch, 
and they answered to a centralized, legitimate state government supportive of a peace 
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operation it had requested.  These factors facilitated efforts to promote a safe and secure 
environment and stable governance.  Moreover, since the peace operation did not have to 
take responsibility for administering Macedonia, there was little risk of the local 
government becoming dependent on the international community.  Therefore, the peace 
operation could withdraw without undermining the internal stability and security of the 
nation.  This also meant that the peace operation’s manpower and resourcing 
requirements were proportionately significantly less than those demanded in Bosnia. 
 Despite this overall positive evaluation, it would be difficult to prove that 
UNPREDEP’s efforts were responsible for Macedonia overcoming numerous threats to 
its stability without reverting to violent conflict.  Furthermore, it is unclear if Macedonia 
has continued its slow but steady development because UNPREDEP was able to help lay 
a solid foundation of stability and security or in spite of its premature and jarring 
departure.  However, UNPREDEP did demonstrate that a timely, well-organized 
preventive deployment with an appropriate mandate and support from the international 
community and host-nation can be effective at helping promote stability and security, 
even if ultimate responsibility lies with the host nation and its government.  And yet, 
despite its apparent successes, UNPREDEP is still the only example of a UN preventive 
deployment.  The UN may be well served to compare the costs and benefits of engaging 
in conflict preemption versus conflict reconciliation.  The post-Cold War examples in the 
Balkans may persuade the international community that it is in its own best interests to 
devote more of its energy to the former. 
 Based on these case studies, several recurring themes emerge.  All the cases 
demonstrated a need for effective cooperation between civilian and military counterparts.  
The military must be willing and able to engage in aspects of peace operations outside the 
traditional military mission, such as law enforcement and nation building.  It appears this 
lesson is being integrated into U.S. military doctrine.  In November 2005, DoD released 
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, stating that stability operations will be a core U.S. 
military mission the DoD will be prepared to conduct and support.  The directive stresses 
that these operations will be integrated across all DoD activities and given priority 
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comparable to combat operations.  These SSTR operations are likely to be more 
important to the lasting success of military operations than traditional combat operations 
alone.169  Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations, released in October 2008, states that 
America’s future overseas engagements will primarily be multilateral efforts to defeat 
insurgencies, assist fragile states, and provide humanitarian aid.  Therefore, the U.S. 
military will have to strengthen its ability to generate “soft” power and often play a 
supporting role to the civilian agencies in charge of these complex missions.170 
 Another conclusion from this thesis is that although post-conflict peace operations 
can help promote stability and reconstruction, it is much more difficult to help establish 
the unified, legitimate central government and capable institutions that allow the state to 
become fully sovereign.  In Bosnia, American and international nation-building efforts 
have largely had the opposite effect, making the local government dependent on their 
assistance.  The unintended consequence is the international community cannot depart 
without undermining the nation’s stability.  This underscores the need to ensure Bosnian 
institutions are capable of effectively running the state before completely handing the 
reins back to the government in Sarajevo.  UNPREDEP’s efforts in Macedonia have 
proven more effective  in the long-term because they were undertaken before the 
outbreak of a major violent conflict, which meant the peacekeepers had an existing 
legitimate government and institutions with which to work.  This underscores the 
importance and benefit of taking preventive measures to address potential sources of 
conflict before they lead to war. 
 Comparing the results of the Strategic Framework for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction171 evaluations provides additional conclusions.  The assessment of the 
Dayton Accords’ impact on Bosnia’s social well-being concluded that the peace 
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operations effectively reestablished basic services and promoted freedom of movement 
for the return of displaced persons.  However, they were unable to promote long-term 
reforms in education, protection and care for vulnerable groups, full reintegration of 
displaced persons, and social reconstruction between ethnic groups.  The primary cause 
of these failures was the ineffectiveness of the weak central government and institutions 
established by the Accords themselves.  The Bosnian peace operation’s counter-crime 
efforts have had mixed results in promoting a sustainable economy and the rule of law.  
An initial lack of focus on crime fighting allowed organized crime to flourish and 
undermine reforms, but gradual improvements in law enforcement weakened criminal 
networks and facilitated the transition to a legal economy and rule of law.  However, 
efforts to turn over responsibility to local authorities have been undermined by weak law 
enforcement institutions.  UNPREDEP has had better long- term results in promoting a 
safe and secure environment and stable governance in Macedonia.  The primary reason is 
that the nation had not been devastated by war and there was a viable state government 
that the peace operation could partner with and work to strengthen. 
 In summary, comparing the results from the three cases in this thesis point to 
several key conclusions.  The peace operations in Bosnia, supported by a strengthened 
OHR and improved civil-military cooperation, have promoted some aspects of social 
well-being, reduced the level of violent organized crime, and prevented a recurrence of 
violent conflict.  However, their inability to establish a truly unified nation with a strong 
central government and effective state institutions has undermined Bosnia’s long-term 
development and led to dependency on the international community.  UNPREDEP, on 
the other hand, was able to prevent the spread of violence and promote stable governance 
in Macedonia at far lower cost and without undermining the state’s independence.  The 
fact that Macedonia is a sovereign nation making steady progress towards full European 
integration while Bosnia remains a largely divided nation under international supervision 
further highlights the benefits of addressing potential causes of conflict before they lead 
to war.  It appears, however, that the U.S. and the international community have not 
heeded this lesson, since to this day UNPREDEP remains the sole case of a preventive 
deployment. 
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